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ABSTRACT 
 
EVALUATION OF AMMUNITION AND FUEL SUPPLY SYSTEMS 
OF A TURKISH ARMORED BATTALION DURING 
MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT USING SIMULATION 
 
Aydın Özçevik 
M.S. in Industrial Engineering  
Advisor: Assoc. Prof. İhsan Sabuncuoğlu 
July, 2002 
 
 
In current wars, supply systems have become vital factors to reach military 
success. With improvements in technology, the capabilities and means of military units 
have also improved and as a result, the supply materials which military units require 
have also increased greatly. The timely delivery of supply materials to the combatant 
units is the key to success. The delivery of supply materials to combatant units at the 
right time and as needed can only be possible with the efficient planning of supply 
systems by staff officers. The insufficient evaluation of supply systems will cause  
interruptions in delivery of supply materials to combatant units and consequently prevent 
the combatant units from accomplishing their tasks.  
In this study, the existing ammunition and fuel supply systems of an armored 
battalion before alarm order is evaluated via simulation. By using the simulation models 
which were coded for existing systems, commanders will have the capability to detect 
potential problems and take precautions. The main objectives of this study are: (1) To 
evaluate existing systems via simulation because of difficulties in executing real world 
systems due to impediments in creating real world conditions and also economic reasons. 
(2) To detect the factors which have significant effects on the existing system. (3) To 
foresee the probable problems of the existing system by studying the simulation model 
outputs using statistical methods. (4) To select the most critical region of Turkey 
according to performance measures of interest. The codes of models are created by using 
ARENA 3.0 simulation program and SIMAN programming language.  
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ÖZET 
 
ALARM FAALİYETLERİ ESNASINDA BİR TÜRK TANK 
TABURUNUN MÜHİMMAT VE YAKIT İKMAL SİSTEMLERİNİN 
SİMÜLASYONLA ANALİZ EDİLMESİ 
 
Aydın Özçevik 
Endüstri Mühendisliği Bölümü Yüksek Lisans 
Danışman: Doç. Dr. İhsan Sabuncuoğlu 
Temmuz, 2002 
 
 
Günümüz muharebelerinde ikmal sistemleri askeri başarının elde edilmesinde 
önemli faktörler haline gelmiştir. Gelişen teknoloji ile birlikte askeri birliklerin imkan ve 
kabiliyetleri de gelişmiş ve bunun sonucunda ihtiyaç duydukları ikmal maddelerinde de 
büyük bir artış olmuştur. İkmal maddelerinin muharip birliklere zamanında dağıtımı 
ordunun başarısı için çok önemlidir. İkmal maddelerinin zamanında ve tam olarak 
muharip birliklere dağıtılabilmesi ancak ikmal sistemlerinin karargah subayları 
tarafından iyi planlanması ile mümkün olabilir. İkmal sistemlerinin iyi analiz edilmemesi 
ikmal maddelerinin muharip birliklere ulaştırılmasında aksaklıklara sebep olacak ve 
neticede muharip birliklerin vazifelerini başarmalarını engelleyecektir. 
 Bu çalışmada, bir tank taburunun alarm emri öncesi kullandığı mevcut mühimmat 
ve yakıt ikmal sistemleri simülasyon vasıtasıyla analiz edilmektedir. Komutanlar henüz 
barış zamanında iken mevcut sistemler için kurulan simülasyon modellerini kullanarak, 
mevcut sistemlerin icrasında karşılaşabilecekleri muhtemel problemleri önceden görme 
ve bunlara karşı tedbir alma imkanına sahip olacaklardır. Bu çalışmanın ana hedefleri: 
(1) Gerek gerçek koşulların oluşturulmasındaki güçlük ve gerekse maddi nedenler 
dolayısıyla tatbiki zor olan mevcut mühimmat ve yakıt ikmal sistemlerini simülasyon 
vasıtasıyla analiz etmek. (2) Sistemler üzerine etkili olan faktörleri tespit etmek.           
(3) Simülasyon modellerinin çıktılarını istatiksel metodlarla inceleyerek sistemlerdeki 
muhtemel problemleri önceden görmek. (4) Performans kriterlerine göre en kritik 
bölgeyi seçmektir. Modellerin kodları ARENA 3.0 simülasyon programı kullanılarak ve 
SIMAN dilinde yazılmıştır.  
 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Askeri Simülasyon, Mühimmat İkmali, Yakıt İkmali, Lojistik          
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GLOSSARY 
 
Alert Dispersion Area: Area where the troops spread to minimize the casualties during 
enemy attack. 
Ammunition: Military stores, especially of explosives (shells, bombs, etc.) to be used 
against the enemy. 
Armored Vehicle: A vehicle covered with metal sheeting for protection and equipped 
with special guns. 
Battalion: An army unit made of several companies and forming part of a brigade. 
Company: Subdivision of a battalion, commanded by a captain. 
Convoy: To travel, especially said of motor vehicles, in a procession for safety and 
convenience.  
Field Manual: Military publication for use by military personnel explaining tactics and 
techniques of any military activity.  
Logistics: The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of 
forces. 
Maintenance: Maintenance is the function of sustaining material (weapon systems, 
components, spares, support equipment) and facilities in an operational status; restoring 
them to a serviceable condition; or upgrading their functional utility through modification. 
Mobilization: A situation in which the power, sources and mainly the military forces of 
the country are prepared, gathered, arranged and used for the needs of a war and in which 
the rights and liberties are limited partially or wholly. 
                              
 1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of the supply systems is to provide the supply materials to the 
military units on time and in order. Any delay or disorder in distribution of supply 
materials to military units because of improper functioning of supply systems can 
prevent military units from carrying out their missions. The timely delivery of supply 
materials to forces in the field is the key to success of military units’ missions. In the 
Turkish military, there are five classes of supply materials (Kara Kuvvetleri Lojistik 
Faktörler Yönergesi, 1994) and these supply materials are as follows: 
Class-I  : This class includes subsistence items and health and welfare items. 
Class-II : This class includes items of equipment, other than principal items, that are 
prescribed in authorization and allowance tables. Individual tools and tool sets, 
individual equipment and clothing items, batteries and housekeeping supplies are in this 
class of supply. 
Class-III : This class comprises all types of petroleum products. All types of motorin, 
benzin jet fuel, lubricants, greases, hydraulic fluids, antifreeze materials and firewoods 
are considered as class-III supply materials. 
Class-IV : This class comprises materials that are used for special duties. 
Class-V : This class comprises all ammunition items (small arms, artillery and tank 
rounds, mines and demolotions, fuzes, missiles and bombs). 
  In our study we only focus on two classes of supply materials. These are Class-ІІІ 
and Class-V supply materials. Class-ІІІ supply materials provide mobility of military 
units and Class-V supply materials provide the fire power. Our systems are subsystems 
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of the Army Logistics System which aims to support the soldier in the field on time and 
with the required amount of supply materials. The Army Logistics System connects all 
logistics activities and establishes a framework of fundamental logistics principles which 
helps the army to accomplish its mission. The models of our systems are examples of 
combat simulation because they include combat activities like enemy air and artillery 
attack. 
 In this study, we model the ammunition and fuel supply systems of one of the 
armored battalions in the Turkish Army during mobilization and deployment using 
simulation. We study the following two systems which are used in the Turkish military: 
• Ammunition and fuel supply of an armored battalion at supply points 
(System-1). 
• Ammunition and fuel supply of an armored battalion by ammunition trucks 
and fuel tankers at alert dispersion areas (System-2). 
We develop simulation models of these systems because of their importance in 
achieving military objectives. Improper functioning of systems would cause delays in 
carrying out military objectives and also increase personnel casualties and number of 
destroyed vehicles if the battalion is under enemy threat. In our study, the armored 
battalion under consideration is positioned close to a regional border and under enemy 
threat. 
 In this study, we aim to reach our following objectives: (1) To examine the 
behaviors of these two existing systems. (2) To detect the factors which have significant 
effects on existing systems. (3) To find time standards of existing systems. (4) To rank 
the regions of Turkey from most to least critical according to performance measures of 
interest. 
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As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Turkish 
military uses NATO standards and unit structures. In a Turkish armored battalion there 
are four companies. The main firepower of the battalion is provided by three identical 
armored companies and these companies are supported by Headquarters Company. The 
structure of an armored battalion is presented in Appendix-H. In our models, the distance 
between company alert dispersion areas and garages is 400 meters. The distance between 
garages and the ammunition depot is 8 km. The distance between the ammunition depot 
and fuel supply points is 1 km. 
Military units have two main activities when tension between two countries 
increases and a would-be conflict is imminent. The first one is to disperse vehicles at 
alert dispersion areas as soon as possible so as not to be a mass target in case of a sudden 
enemy attack. The second one is to complete supply material needs of personnel and 
vehicles as soon as possible. At peace times, armored vehicles are unloaded of 
ammunition because of safety reasons. In our models, the ammunition of armored 
vehicles is preserved in the ammunition depot of the battalion and the ammunition of 
small arms (i.e. rifles) is preserved in ammunition trucks. When military tension between 
two countries increases, companies distribute the ammunition of small arms to company 
personnel as soon as possible. In our study, we only deal with ammunition loading of 
armored vehicles. We assume that armored and wheeled vehicles are half fueled because 
we can not be sure about the level of fuel in each vehicle. The level of fuel in a vehicle 
tank would change according to its daily consumption. In real life, ammunition depots 
and fuel supply points are highly protected against enemy attacks. In our study, we 
assume that there is a strong air defense system against enemy planes around the 
ammunition depot and fuel supply points. 
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System-1, ammunition and fuel supply of armored battalion at supply points, 
starts with the order of battalion commander. In this existing system, armored and 
wheeled vehicles travel to supply points for ammuniton and fuel supply. After the order 
of the battalion commander, companies of the battalion start preparations. Ammunition 
of small arms is distributed and vehicle crews start to prepare their vehicles to travel to 
supply points. When preparations are done, each company’s armored vehicles convoy to 
the ammunition depot via preplanned company pathes. The armored vehicles of 
Headquarters Company convoy with the armored vehicles of armored companies to the 
ammunition depot. Wheeled vehicles also convoy to company fuel supply points in 
company formation. Armored vehicles queue close to the ammunition depot which has 
two loading points according to the priority of their companies’ tasks in battalion plans. 
In our study, the queue order of companies for ammunition supply is 1st Company, 2nd 
Company and 3rd Company. At the ammunition depot, the loaded armored vehicle 
immediately travels to its company fuel supply point and queues with other wheeled or 
armored vehicles. At fuel supply points company wheeled vehicles wait for the 
completion of the rest of company wheeled vehicles’ fuel supply and when all are fueled, 
wheeled vehicles convoy to the company alert dispersion area. Armored vehicles also 
convoy after fueling to company alert dispersion area. The system ends when all 
undestroyed armored and wheeled vehicles of the battalion arrive to alert dispersion 
areas. During convoys, some stochastic events like breakdowns, enemy air attacks and 
enemy artillery attacks can occur. These events can damage or destroy vehicles during 
convoy and delay the supply activity, hence the mission success of the armored battalion. 
When a vehicle is destroyed by enemy attack or breakdown it is taken off the road, not to 
create traffic congestion. If it is damaged by enemy attack or breakdown, a vehicle crew 
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tries to repair the vehicle. If it can not be repaired, then a maintenance team is called. 
The ammunition and fuel supply flow in System-1 can be seen in Figure 1.1.  
System-2, ammunition and fuel supply of armored battalion by ammunition 
trucks and fuel tankers, also starts with the order of the battalion commander. The main 
difference of this system from System-1 is the distribution of supply materials to 
armored and wheeled vehicles. Only supply vehicles from Headquarters Company 
convoy to supply points and then transport supply materials to alert dispersion areas. 
After the order of the battalion commander, the ammunition trucks and fuel tankers from 
Headquarters Company complete their preparations to convoy to supply points. At the 
same time, the rest of the armored and wheeled vehicles of the battalion travel to 
company alert dispersion areas so as not to be a mass target at garages. All of the 
ammunition trucks responsible for transportation of ammunition to any company of the 
battalion convoy to the ammunition depot and all of the fuel tankers responsible for fuel 
supply of any company of battalion convoy to the company fuel supply point. At the 
ammunition depot, ammunition trucks are loaded according to the priority of each 
companies’ tasks. After ammunition trucks are loaded, they convoy to company alert 
dispersion areas. They unload their ammunition at the company alert dispersion areas 
then proceed to Headquarters Company alert dispersion area. Armored vehicles’ crews 
start to load their vehicles and then wait for the fuel supply process. Fuel tankers first 
fuel wheeled vehicles of companies at alert dispersion areas and then fuel armored 
vehicles. Fuel tankers also travel to the Headquarters Company alert dispersion area 
when all fuel supply activity is completed. During travel, some stochastic events like 
breakdowns, air and artillery attacks can occur. These events can damage or destroy 
supply vehicles during convoys. If  an ammunition truck or fuel  tanker is  destroyed  and 
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can be safely moved, then it is taken off the road. If it is not safe to move because of fire 
or explosion, then necessary safety measures are taken and other supply vehicles are 
directed to alternate safe paths. The supply materials are distributed accordingly at alert 
dispersion areas despite the loss of ammunition or fuel because of enemy attacks. If the 
supply vehicles are destroyed on the way to supply points, then spare supply vehicles are 
sent to supply points. When an ammunition truck or fuel tanker is damaged, the vehicle 
driver first tries to repair the vehicle and if he can not repair the damage, then a 
maintenance crew is called. These events can delay the supply activity, hence the 
mission success of the armored battalion. The armored and wheeled vehicles at alert 
dispersion areas are also under enemy threat. They can be destroyed or damaged by 
enemy attacks but these events do not cause important delays in the system since these 
vehicles had already been at alert dispersion areas before enemy attacks occured. The 
system ends when all undestroyed vehicles are supplied at alert dispersion areas. The 
ammunition and fuel supply flow in System-2 can be seen in Figure 1.2. 
We study the systems via simulation because of the difficulties in creating real 
world war conditions such as air and artillery attacks. Simulation also enables us to 
include stochastic events such as vehicle maintenance and breakdown. Finally, 
simulation is far more economical than exercising the systems in the field. We use Arena 
3.0 simulation program in our study because it is a powerful and flexible tool with 
animation capabilities. 
 The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we present the relevant 
literature with the simulation software and methods; general supply system applications 
in the field of military logistics similar to our systems; the requirements of military 
simulation modeling; combat  modeling applications. In Chapter 3, we  describe  existing 
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systems. The conceptual models of existing systems, verification and validation of 
models are explained in this chapter. In Chapter 4, we give the design and analysis of 
experiments. The results of the statistical analyses are also presented in this chapter. In 
Chapter 5, we rank the regions of Turkey from most to least critical according to 
performance measures of interest. The results of simulation study and future research 
suggestions are given in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In the literature review we could not find a study which considers all aspects of  
ammunition and fuel supply systems of an armored battalion. Our systems are military 
logistics systems which operate under enemy threat. In this chapter, we  review some 
studies about combat modeling because our models include combat activities such as 
enemy air and artillery attacks. We also review some of the studies related military 
logistics because our models include distribution activities of supply materials. We 
organize this chapter as follows: 
• Simulation software and methodology 
• Military simulation 
• Combat modeling 
• Military logistics 
 
2.1. Simulation Software and Methodology 
While building the simulation models and performing some of the analyses of the 
outputs, we used ARENA 3.0 and its output Analyzer, which is a product of Systems 
Modeling Corporation. Takus and Profozich (1997) explain the ARENA software and its 
capabilities in their tutorial. 
Jennifer Chew and Cindy Sullivan (2000) explain the activities and tasks during 
the early stages of model development and address each of Verification, Validation and 
Accreditation (VV&A) efforts separately, along with its associated activities. They 
 11 
outline the specific VV&A activities and products that are appropriate to each phase of 
model development. 
 Law and Kelton (1991) explain the timing and relationships of validation, 
verification and establishing credibility, and discuss guidelines for determining the level 
of model detail and some techniques for verification and validation. 
 Don Coughlin (2000) explains an integrated approach to VV&A from a system 
perspective and identifies the relationships between the M&S resources in an integrated 
VV&A program. 
Balci Osman (1998) explains how to create sufficiently valid models and 
principles of verification and validation. 
Sargent (1998) explains various verification and validation techniques and 
discusses conceptual model validity, model verification and data validity. 
  Alexopoulos and Seila (1998) explain techniques and procedures dealing with 
output data analysis. 
Law and Kelton (1991) explain some comparison techniques and describe 
ranking and selection procedures. 
 
2.2. Military Simulation 
In this section, we present the papers related with military modeling and 
simulation. These papers provide insights regarding military simulation theory and the 
underlying limitations assocatiated with them. We use guidance from them to define our 
models and better understand the problems we could encounter before creating the 
models. 
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 Metz Micheal (2000) focuses on Joint Warfare System (JWARS) verification and 
validation processes. JWARS users include the United States Joint Staff, regional 
military commanders, the office of secretary of defense, and military Joint Task of 
Forces. 
Grabau M. and Payne M. (2000) provide planners to assess critical factors such as 
transportation network constraints, equipment reliability and maintainability, varying 
task times and the effects of air interdiction. 
Raymond R.Hill, J.Miller and Gregory A. (2001) discuss the uses of military 
simulation and the issues associated with military simulation to include categorizations 
of various types of military simulation. 
Garrabrants (1998) proposes an expansion of simulation systems’ roles to support 
all levels of command and control functioning. He explains how Marine Tactical 
Warfare Simulation is used to model all aspects of combat. 
 Hartley (1997) stresses on the difficulties, methods and cost of the military 
simulation studies and presents the comparison of military simulation studies with others 
in terms of verification, validation and accreditation. 
 Robinson Stewart (1997) provides an understanding of how simulation models 
can be verified and validated. He aims to show where Verification and Validation 
(V&V) fit within the overall modelling process and to describe various methods of 
V&V. 
 Sisti (1996) deals with a wide variety of research issues in simulation science 
being presented by government, academia, industry and their application to the military 
domain. 
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 Smith (1998) provides a brief historical introduction and goes on with essential 
methods necessary for modern military training simulations in his study. He stresses on 
the importance of modeling the right problem while mentioning the fundamental 
principles of military modeling. 
 Kang and Roland (1998) stress on the differences of military simulation and 
classify the military simulation models in their study. They provide some explanations 
about simulation as a training tool and also mention a war-gaming model of joint theater-
level simulation. 
 Pace (1993) discusses naval modeling and simulation verification, validation and 
accreditation. He reviews VV&A processes developed as interim policy guidance for 
navy managed models and simulations. 
 
2.3. Combat Modeling 
 In this section, we review studies of combat modeling because our models 
include combat activities such as enemy air and artillery attacks. Few declassified papers 
are available in the field of combat modeling due to the highly sensitive nature of the 
information. The combat activities in our models, air and artıllery attacks, are highly 
anticipated in a typical war. These papers help us integrate these anticipated combat 
activities into our models.  
Müslüm and Sabuncuoğlu (2002) develop a simulation model of mobilization and 
deployment activities of one of the armored battalions in the Turkish Army that includes 
loading of vehicles, marching to alert dispersion area, and marching to the assembly area 
under enemy attack. The authors measure the combat readiness of an armored battalion. 
Specifically, they present a decision support tool for armored battalion commanders to 
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observe the troop behavior in a computer-simulated environment before the war. Of all 
the studies from the literature review, this paper  provided the most applicable combat 
modeling information for our study. Similarities include stochastic events such as air and 
artillery attacks, the same armored battalion structure and analysis of critical regions in 
Turkey. Their study does not include logistics activities such as ammunition loading and 
fuel supply. Our study attempts to capture this feature of mobilization and deployment 
planning for a Turkish Armored Battalion using the same ARENA 3.0 simulation 
software.  
 Parker (1995) explains a unique approach developed for analyzing force 
structures of the armed forces of United States of America. With this approach, combat 
readiness is measured to ensure armed forces remain ready to fight despite military 
drawdown. 
 Childs and Lubaczewski (1987) propose a simulation model used for training 
Brigade and Battalion commanders and their staff to improve their decision-making 
skills. 
 Henry (1994) describes the Corps Battle Simulation as a standard tool for training 
commanders and their staff. He also stated the hardware and evaluation of the Corps 
Battle Simulation. 
Youngren, Parry, Gaver and Jacobs (1994) describe research conducted at the 
Naval Postgraduate School into new methodologies for joint theater-level combat 
simulation modeling. 
 Blais (1994) gives the description of a computer assisted, two-sided warfare 
gaming system designed to support training of U.S. Marine Corps commanders and their 
staffs. 
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 Mostaglio, Johnson and Peterson (1993) give an overview of a distributed 
interactive simulation training system used in the army called the close combat tactical 
trainer. They discuss how protocol standards within its program architecture will ensure 
its long term training success. 
 Oswalt Ivar (1995) presents the technologies critical to military simulation. He 
proposes technologies that are likely to be applied in future military simulations, and 
concludes with a review of two current simulation architectures-SIMOBJECT and         
J-MASS. 
 Kathman (1995) explains the processes and techniques of data collection in field 
combat simulation with particular attention to data requirements, operational 
environment, and instrumentation. He describes four basic types of instrumentation that 
have been developed to assist data collection in field combat simulation. 
 
2.4. Military Logistics 
 In this section, we review some studies about military logistics because our 
models include distribution activities of supply materials. These papers show specific 
applications for fuel and ammunition supply systems even though they are in separate 
military branches. We expand our search of supply systems beyond ammunition and 
fuel. These papers highlight the areas of ammunition and fuel supply systems and help us 
create valid models for our existing systems. 
 Parsons and Krause (1999) introduce the Tactical Logistics and Distribution 
Systems (TLOADS) simulation model that is a tool to study the delivery of logistics 
material to U.S. Marine Expeditionary Forces. This tool tries to provide inexpensive, 
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flexible and frequent evaluations of new logistics delivery tactics and logistics material 
transport vehicles. 
 Parker and Williams (1997) introduce a model to develop alternative approaches 
to Air Force logistics support strategies. The model makes it possible to evaluate the 
steady state flow of fuel and ammunition. 
Parker (1990) developes a simulation model capable of analyzing the deployment 
strategies of combat, combat support and service support units. The model is developed 
on the deployment of the field artillery ammunition carrying vehicles to an ammunition 
supply. 
All these studies in the literature are summarized in Table 2.1.   
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Table 2.1. Summary Table of Related Literature 
CLASSIFICATION PUBLICATION SUBJECT 
Takus and Profozich (1997) ARENA software tutorial 
Don Coughlin (2000) An integrated approach to VV&A  of models and simulations 
Jennifer and Cindy (2000) VV&A in the life cycle of models 
Sargent (1998) V&V of simulation models  
Simulation Software 
and Methodology 
Kelton (1997) Statistical analysis of simulation output 
Grabau and Payne (2000) Predicting enemy force closure with simulation 
Metz Micheal (2000) Joint warfare system verification and validation lessons learned 
Raymond Hill, Miller and 
Gregory (2001) 
Applications of discrete event 
simulation modeling to military 
problems 
Garrabrants (1998) Simulation as a mission planning and rehearsal tool 
Hartley (1997) V&V in military simulations 
Oswalt Ivar (1995) Technology trends in military simulation 
Sisti (1996) Modeling and simulation technologies for military applications 
Smith (1998) Essential techniques for military modeling and simulation 
Kang and Roland (1998) Military simulation 
Military Simulation 
Pace (1993) Naval modeling and simulation VV&A 
Parker (1995) 
Military force structure and 
realignment through dynamic 
simulation 
Childs and Lubaczewski (1987) A battalion/brigade training simulation 
Henry (1994) The Corps battle simulation 
Blais (1995) 
Scalability issues in enhancement of 
the MAGTF tactical warfare 
simulation 
Kathman (1985) Data collection in field combat  
Youngren and Parry (1993) The future theater-level combat 
Mostaglio,Johnson and 
Peterson (1993) 
The close combat tactical training 
program 
Combat Modeling 
Müslüm and Sabuncuoğlu 
(2002) 
Evaluation of Mobilization and 
Deployment Plan of an Armored 
Battalion  
Parker (1990) Ammunition upload and deployment 
Parker and Williams (1997) Integrating logistics support operations Military Logistics 
Parsons and Krause (1999) Tactical logistics and distribution systems simulation 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SIMULATION MODEL 
 
3.1. Formulation of the Problem and Planning the Study 
 We develop the models of ammunition and fuel supply systems of an armored 
battalion during mobilization and deployment using simulation to enable commanders to 
examine the behaviors of existing systems before conducting real exercises. The systems 
we analyze in this study are: 
• Ammunition and fuel supply of an armored battalion at supply points (System-1) 
• Ammunition and fuel supply of an armored battalion by ammunition trucks and 
fuel tankers at alert dispersion areas (System-2) 
In this study we have the following objectives: (1) To examine the behaviors of 
the existing systems by constructing valid models of systems. (2) To detect the factors 
which have significant effects on existing systems. (3) To find time standards of existing 
systems. (4) To rank the regions of Turkey from most to least critical according to 
performance measures of interest. 
We have two main performance measures in our study for both models. These 
performance measures are maximum time-in-system and number of destroyed vehicles. 
Maximum time-in-system is the time the last battalion vehicle arrives at the alert 
dispersion area after supply activity. Both performance measures have vital importance 
in the military since they affect the course of war. By using our simulation models, we 
try to answer the following questions: 
• Do the systems operate efficiently? 
• What can be the time standards of the systems? 
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• How do vehicle breakdowns, enemy air attacks and enemy artillery attacks affect 
the system performances? 
• What are the significant factors on performance measures? 
• Which region of Turkey is the most critical region against enemy air and artillery 
attacks? 
• What is the ranking of regions of Turkey according to maximum time-in-system 
performance measure? 
We study the systems under war conditions and we need the following data in our 
simulation models. 
 
For  Model-1, 
• Velocity of armored vehicles. 
• Velocity of wheeled vehicles. 
• Ammunition loading time of an armored vehicle. 
• Fuel supply time of an armored vehicle. 
• Fuel supply time of a wheeled vehicle.  
• Maintenance times for vehicles due to vehicle breakdowns, air attacks and 
artillery attacks.  
 
For Model-2, 
• Velocity of ammunition trucks. 
• Velocity of fuel tankers. 
• Ammunition loading and unloading times of ammunition trucks. 
• Fuel supply time of a fuel tanker. 
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• Maintenance times for vehicles due to vehicle breakdowns, air attacks and 
artillery attacks.  
• Ammunition loading time of an armored vehicle. 
• Fuel supply times of armored and wheeled vehicles. 
 
By using the models, the military planners can examine the physical behaviors of 
systems with the help of animation. The models can be adapted to model other supply 
systems of the army using the flexibility of Arena software. The end users of this study 
are the armored battalion commanders. 
 
3.2. Why Simulation? 
 We model the existing systems and analyze them by using simulation for the 
following reasons: 
• The systems under study have many stochastic features such as vehicle 
breakdowns, enemy air attacks and maintenance times for damages due to enemy 
attacks. 
• Because of economic reasons and difficulties creating real world conditions, it is 
almost impossible to exercise the systems in the field. 
• Simulation enables us to analyze different policies and system alternatives in our 
study. 
• Simulation enables us to animate our models. Animations of our models greatly 
assist in the models’ validation and also help present our models to other people. 
• By using simulation we compare different scenarios of existing systems in the 
study. 
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• Simulation enables us to train military personnel in a safe environment. 
  
3.3. Model Development 
 The first step in model building consists of observing the real system and the 
interactions among its various components and collecting data on its behavior. The 
second step in model building is the construction of a conceptual model (a collection of 
assumptions on the components and the structure of the system, plus hypotheses on the 
values of model input parameters). The third step is the translation of the operational 
model into the computerized model. (Banks, Carson, and Nelson, 1999) 
We form the conceptual models of our real systems by data gathered from the 
experts of supply systems and also from users of the systems. The warfare related data 
are taken primarily from army publications. We interviewed personnel responsible for 
ammunition depot and fuel supply points to obtain information about ammunition 
loading and fuel supply processes. We also interviewed maintenance personnel to gather  
maintenance times for possible damages and squadran leaders for insights about 
difficulties during supply activities. After we gathered enough data about real systems, 
we developed the logical model (flowchart) of the systems to show relationships among 
the elements of the models. We then wrote the code of simulation models by using the 
Arena 3.0 simulation program. 
 
3.3.1. Conceptual Model 
 “The construction of a model is probably as much art as science. The art of 
modeling is enhanced by an ability to abstract the essential features of the problem, to 
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select and modify basic assumptions that characterize the system, and then to enrich and 
elaborate the model until a useful approximation results” (Banks, Carson, Nelson, 1999). 
A conceptual model is not intended to be a design for a system to simulate the 
real world. Rather, it provides an organised way for an analyst to document the workings 
of the system of interest and a framework for the modeller to document the system. Only 
objects necessary for understanding of the system need to be documented. 
 To examine the essential components and structures of the real world systems 
under consideration, we devise conceptual models of these real world systems. In our 
study the real world systems of interest are: 
 
• Ammunition and fuel supply of an armored battalion at supply points (System-1). 
• Ammunition and fuel supply of an armored battalion by ammunition trucks and 
fuel tankers at alert dispersion areas  (System-2). 
 
We present the basic elements of our simulation models in the following: 
Events 
Common Events for Model-1 and Model-2 
• Breakdown of vehicles. 
• Maintenance of broken vehicles. 
• Artillery attack of enemy. 
• Loading of ammunition to armored vehicles. 
• Air attack of enemy. 
• Damage of vehicles because of enemy attacks. 
• Completion of maintenance of damaged and broken vehicles. 
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Unique Model-1 Events 
• Departure of armored and wheeled vehicles to supply points. 
• Arrival of armored vehicles to ammunition depot. 
• Arrival of wheeled vehicles to fuel supply points. 
• Fuel supply to armored and wheeled vehicles. 
• Departure of vehicles to alert dispersion areas from supply points. 
• Arrival of vehicles to alert dispersion areas. 
Unique Model-2 Events  
• Departure of ammunition trucks and fuel tankers to supply points. 
• Departure of armored and wheeled vehicles to company alert dispersion areas. 
• Arrival of armored and wheeled vehicles to company alert dispersion areas. 
• Arrival of ammunition trucks to ammunition depot. 
• Arrival of fuel tankers to fuel supply points. 
• Loading of ammunition to ammunition trucks. 
• Fuel supply to fuel tankers. 
• Departure of ammunition trucks and fuel tankers to alert dispersion areas from 
supply points. 
• Arrival of ammunition trucks and fuel tankers to alert dispersion areas. 
• Unloading of ammunition from ammunition trucks.  
• Fuel supply to armored and wheeled vehicles by fuel tankers. 
• Completion of ammunition loading to armored vehicles. 
• Completion of fuel supply to armored and wheeled vehicles. 
• Departure of ammunition trucks and fuel tankers to Headquarters Company alert 
dispersion area. 
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• Arrival of ammunition trucks and fuel tankers to Headquarters Company alert 
dispersion area. 
 
Entities 
Common Entities for Model-1 and Model-2  
• Armored vehicles. 
• Wheeled vehicles. 
Unique Model-2 Entities 
• Fuel tankers. 
• Ammunition Trucks. 
 
Activities 
Common Activities for Model-1 and Model-2 
• Ammunition loading to armored vehicles. 
• Fuel supply to armored and wheeled vehicles. 
• Convoy of vehicles. 
• Breakdowns of vehicles.  
• Enemy attacks. 
• Maintenance.  
Unique Model-2 Activities 
• Ammunition loading to ammunition trucks. 
• Fuel supply to fuel tankers. 
• Unloading of ammunition from ammunition trucks. 
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Attributes 
Common Attributes for Model-1 and Model-2 
• Company identification numbers. 
• Convoy identification numbers. 
• Fuel level of vehicles. 
• The beginning time of supply activity. 
 
Exogenous Variables (Input Variables) 
a) Decision Variables (Controllable Variables) 
Common Decision Variables for Model-1 and Model-2 
• Number of loading points at ammunition depot. 
• Number of fuel supply points per company. 
Unique Model-1 Decision Variables 
• Velocity of  wheeled and armored vehicles. 
• The vehicle convoy formation (in company or squadran formation). 
Unique Model-2 Decision Variables  
• Velocity of ammunition trucks and fuel tankers. 
• Capacity of ammunition trucks and fuel tankers. 
 
b) Parameters (Uncontrollable Variables) 
Common Parameters for Model-1 and Model-2 
• Ammunition loading time of an armored vehicle. 
• Fuel supply time of an armored vehicle. 
• Fuel supply time of a wheeled vehicle. 
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• Maintenance times for vehicle damages due to enemy air attack and artillery 
attack. 
• Distances between supply points, garages and alert dispersion areas. 
Unique Model-1 Parameters 
• Number of armored and wheeled vehicles. 
Unique Model-2 Parameters 
• Ammunition loading time of an ammunition truck. 
• Fuel supply time of a fuel tanker.  
• Number of ammunition trucks and fuel tankers. 
• Ammunition unloading time of an ammunition truck. 
 
Endogenous Variables (Output Variables) 
a) State variables  
Common State Variables for Model-1 and Model-2 
• State of ammunition loading units. 
• State of fuel supply units. 
Unique Common State Variables for  Model-1 
• Number of armored vehicles in ammunition queue. 
• Number of vehicles in fuel supply queues. 
Unique Common State Variables for  Model-2 
• Number of ammunition trucks in ammunition queue.  
• Number of fuel tankers in fuel supply queues. 
• Number of armored vehicles in ammunition queues at alert dispersion areas. 
• Number of vehicles in fuel supply queues at alert dispersion areas. 
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b) Performance measures 
Common Performance Measures for Model-1 and Model-2 
• Maximum time-in-system (the time the last battalion vehicle occupied its 
position at the alert dispersion area after supply activities). 
• Number of destroyed vehicles.  
• Number of broken vehicles because of vehicle breakdowns. 
• Number of damaged vehicles because of enemy attacks. 
• Utilization of the ammunition loading units. 
• Utilization of fuel supply units. 
Unique Model-1Performance Measures 
• Average time-in-system of an armored vehicle.  
• Average time-in-system of a wheeled vehicle. 
• Average waiting time of an armored vehicle in ammunition queue. 
• Average waiting time of a vehicle (armored and wheeled) in fuel supply queue. 
• Average number of armored vehicles at ammunition depot. 
• Average number of  vehicles (armored and wheeled) at fuel supply point. 
Unique Model-2 Performance Measures 
• Average time-in-system of an ammunition truck. 
• Average time-in-system of a fuel tanker. 
• Average waiting time of an ammunition truck in ammunition queue. 
• Average waiting time of an armored vehicle in ammunition queue at alert 
dispersion area. 
• Average waiting time of a vehicle in fuel supply queue at alert dispersion area. 
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Assumptions 
Common Assumptions for Model-1 and Model-2 
• Basic unit is company. 
• Armored Battalion is an independent mission battalion. 
• In the beginning all armored vehicles are unloaded of ammunition. 
• The personnel in charge at supply points are well trained and there is no accident 
because of personnel mistakes. 
• There is a strong air defense system at supply points against enemy air attacks. 
Unique Model-1 Assumptions 
• The ammunition loading will be carried out by the sequence of 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
armored companies at the ammunition depot. 
• In the beginning all wheeled and armored vehicles are half fueled. 
• Velocity of armored vehicles is 25km/hour. 
• Velocity of wheeled vehicles is 40km/hour. 
Unique Model-2 Assumptions 
• In the beginning all wheeled and armored vehicles are half fueled. 
• The weight of an ammunition box (two shells in one box) is 70 kg. 
• Velocity of ammunition trucks is 30 km/hour. 
• Velocity of fuel tankers is 30 km/hour. 
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3.3.2. Logical Model  
In this section, we explain the logic of Model-1 and Model-2. In Model-1, our 
entities are armored and wheeled vehicles. After it starts, entities resembling wheeled 
vehicles convoy to fuel supply station and entities resembling armored vehicles convoy 
to the ammunition supply station. During convoy some entities go through breakdown or 
artillery attacks according to probabilities given in the model. Those entities which 
experience the breakdown or artillery attacks are delayed by the time depending on 
minor, medium or severe damage status or disposed from the system when completely 
destroyed. At the end, armored vehicle entities arrive at the ammunition supply station 
while wheeled vehicle entities arrive at the fuel supply station. Armored vehicle entities 
are delayed at ammunition supply station before convoying to the fuel supply station and 
queing behind the wheeled vehicle entities. Meanwhile, wheeled vehicle entities are 
delayed at the fuel supply station before convoying to alert dispersion area station. 
Armored vehicle entities are delayed after completion of wheeled vehicle entities 
fueling. Armored vehicle entities convoy to alert dispersion area station after the delay. 
Some armored and wheeled vehicle entities go through breakdown or air attack stations 
during convoy to the alert dispersion area station. Those entities which experience the 
breakdown or air attacks are delayed by the time depending on minor, medium, or severe 
damage status or disposed from the system when completely destroyed. The last entity to 
reach the alert dispersion area station completes the model. We present the simplified 
flowchart of  Model-1 in Figure 3.1 and detailed flowchart of Model-1 in Appendix-A. 
In Model-2, our entities are armored vehicles, wheeled vehicles, ammunition 
trucks and fuel tankers. After the model starts, entities resembling wheeled and armored 
vehicles convoy to alert  dispersion area station  and do  not  visit any stations  during the 
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Ammunition and Fuel Supply of an Armored Battalion at Supply Points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Simplified Flowchart of System-1
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convoy. They wait at the alert dispersion area station until ammunition truck and fuel 
tanker entities arrive. Meanwhile, ammunition truck entities convoy to the ammunition 
supply station and fuel tanker entities convoy to the fuel supply station. During convoy 
some ammunition truck and fuel tanker entities go through breakdown or artillery attack 
stations according to probabilities given in the model. Those entities which experience 
the breakdown or artillery attacks are delayed by the time depending on minor, medium, 
or severe damage status or disposed from the system when completely destroyed. At the 
end, ammunition truck and fuel tanker entities arrive at the supply stations. Ammunition 
truck entities are delayed at the ammunition supply station while fuel tanker entities are 
delayed at the fuel supply station. After supply activity delays, entities convoy to the 
alert dispersion area station to supply armored and wheeled vehicle entities. Some 
ammunition truck and fuel tanker entities go through breakdown or air attack stations 
during convoy to the alert dispersion area station. Those entities which experience the 
breakdown or air attacks are delayed by the time depending on minor, medium, or severe 
damage status or disposed from the system when completely destroyed. Ammunition 
truck and fuel tanker entities are delayed to unload their supply material before travelling 
to alert dispersion area station. The last entity to arrive to the alert dispersion area station 
completes the model. We present the simplified flowchart of Model-2 in Figure 3.2 and 
detailed flowchart of Model-2 in Appendix-A. 
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Figure 3.2. Simplified Flowchart of System-2 
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Figure 3.2. Simplified Flowchart of System-2 (cont’d) 
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3.3.3. Simulation Model (Computer Code) 
In our study we use ARENA 3.0 software for the simulation codes of existing 
systems. Arena software has the capability of creating animated models and is a flexible 
tool. We have two models in our study. The model of ammunition and fuel supply of an 
armored battalion at supply points, Model-1, and the model of ammunition and fuel 
supply of an armored battalion by ammunition trucks and fuel tankers at alert dispersion 
areas, Model-2. Some details are as follows: 
• Technical information about Model-1  
Size of model                                           : 3.64 MB 
Total number of lines                               : 460 Siman lines 
• Technical information about Model-2 
Size of model                                           : 4.21 MB 
Total number of lines                               : 633 Siman lines 
We present some parts of the computer codes of Model-1 and Model-2 in Appendix-G. 
 
3.4. Input Data Analysis 
There are three probability distributions which are often used in absence of data 
or limited data. These distributions are the uniform, triangular and beta distributions. The 
uniform distribution can be used when an interarrival or service time is known to be 
random, but no information is immediately available about the distribution. The 
triangular distribution can be used when we have some information about the minimum, 
maximum and modal values of the random variable. The beta distribution provides a 
variety of distributional forms on the unit interval which with appropriate modification 
can be shifted to any desired interval (Pegden, Shannon and Sadowski, 1995). 
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In our case, since we do not have actual data for war conditions, we use triangular 
distributions. The parameters of the distribution functions are obtained from army field 
manuals and defense ministry publications. For data concerning ammunition and fuel 
supply activities in war conditions, we use Kara Kuvvetleri Lojistik Faktörler Yönergesi 
(Turkish Army Logistics Procedures) which is mainly used for logistics calculations for 
the Turkish Army. We interviewed expert personnel from ammunition and fuel supply 
activities in the army. We also interviewed maintenance personnel for technical 
information and staff officers for tactical information. 
We present the parameters of triangular distribution for maintenance times of 
wheeled vehicles in Table 3.1 and maintenance times of armored vehicles in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.1. Maintenance Times of Wheeled Vehicles 
Damage Type  
Minor Damage Medium Damage Severe Damage 
Vehicle Breakdown Tria (10,15,20) Tria (25,30,35) Tria (40,45,50) 
Air Attack Tria (30,35,40) Tria (35,40,45) Tria (50,55,60) 
Artillery Attack Tria (20,25,30) Tria (35,40,45) Tria (50,55,60) 
 
 
 
Table 3.2. Maintenance Times of Armored Vehicles 
Damage Type  
Minor Damage Medium Damage Severe Damage 
Vehicle Breakdown Tria (15,20,25) Tria (30,35,40) Tria (45,50,55) 
Air Attack Tria (35,40,45) Tria (40,45,50) Tria (55,60,65) 
Artillery Attack Tria (25,30,35) Tria (40,45,50) Tria (55,60,65) 
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The parameters of distribution functions of ammunition loading times and fuel 
supply times are obtained by interviewing expert personnel at supply activities and 
studying Kara Kuvvetleri Lojistik Faktörler Yönergesi (Turkish Army Logistics 
Procedures, 1994). We present ammunition loading times in Table 3.3  and fuel supply 
times in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.3. Ammunition Loading Times 
 
Vehicle Loading Time 
Armored Vehicle Tria (20,25,30) 
Ammunition Truck Tria (65,75,85) 
 
 
Table 3.4. Fuel Supply Times 
Vehicle Fuel Supply Time 
Wheeled Vehicle Tria (1,3,6) 
Armored Vehicle Tria (4,7,10) 
 
We take destruction probabilities of enemy air and artillery weapons from the 
JANUS database (http://www-leav.army.mil/nsc/famsim/janus/index.htm) software, the 
war simulation package which is used to model combat field activities. In our study, we 
use the ARENA software because JANUS is only used for combat activities. JANUS is 
effective for battle-focused training from platoon to brigade level and for command and 
battle staff training. We not only deal with combat activies in our study but also logistics 
activities. ARENA allows us to model logistics activities and also combat activities. 
Logistics activities include the storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, 
and disposition of material; evacuation and hospitalization of personnel; construction, 
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maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities. We present destruction probabilities 
of enemy weapons in Table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5. Destruction Probabilities of Enemy Weapons 
 Wheeled Vehicles Armored Vehicles 
Enemy War Plane Cannon (30 mm) 0.65 0.55 
Enemy Artillery Cannon (155 mm) 0.5 0.35 
 
 
3.5.  Verification and Validation of the Models 
  In this section, we discuss whether our simulation models operate correctly and 
whether they simulate their real-world counterparts. Verification and validation of the 
model is one of the challenging tasks for the model developer. 
 
3.5.1. Verification of the Models 
Verification is the process of determining whether a model operates as intended. 
The purpose of model verification is to ensure that the conceptual model is reflected 
accurately in the computerized representation. In this section, the computer programs 
representing existing systems are verified by techniques recommended by (Banks, 
Carson and Nelson, 1999) and by techniques stated in Department of the Army  
Pamphlet 5-11 (1999). 
 
• Debugging : We used Arena debugger so as not to make logical mistakes when 
building our models. By applying the debugging process, we test our models to reveal 
 38 
the existence of errors. Then we make necessary model changes to correct the detected 
errors in models and retest to ensure successful modification. This iterative process 
continues until no errors are identified in our models. 
• Design Walkthroughs : The walkthrough procedure involves gathering a small 
group for an informal review of the model’s logic. We applied this procedure by 
gathering the personnel responsible for ammunition and fuel supply activities in the 
battalion, maintenance personnel and also the armored squadran leaders. We 
incorporated their comments into the models. 
 
• Using Animation as a Verification Aid : Animation presents a dynamically 
moving picture of many interactions taking place within the simulation. Such 
interactions are often the source of errors. By animating our models we followed the 
complex interactions occuring in our models and corrected some minor mistakes. 
 
• Checking  : The codes of our models were checked by Gokhan Celik, Ozan 
Pembe and Burhan Urek who are all military officers and have expertise in military 
simulation modelling and analysis. First, we explained the systems under consideration 
and then allowed them to check the codes of our models. 
 
3.5.2. Validation of the Models 
 Validation is the process of determining the degree to which a model or 
simulation is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the 
intended uses of the model (Department of the Army Pamphlet 5-11, 1999). Validation is 
concerned with building the right model. In our study we validate our models by using 
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the techniques recommended by (Banks, Carson and Nelson, 1999) and by the 
techniques stated in Department of the Army Pamphlet 5-11 (1999). 
 
• Sensitivity Analysis : Sensitivity analysis is performed by systematically 
changing model input variables and parameters over some range of interest and 
observing the effect upon model behavior. Unexpected effects reveal invalidity. We 
applied sensitivity analysis by changing input variables of our models. The details are as 
follows: 
 
Sensitivity analysis for Model-1 
 
We change the parameters of triangular distribution for ammunition loading time 
and fuel supply time to armored vehicles in our model. Our aim is to observe effects of 
changes in our model. We expect an increase in maximum time-in-system statistics when 
we increase the parameters of triangular distributions of these random variables. 
Firstly, we increase the parameters of triangular distribution for ammunition 
loading time to an armored vehicle in our model. The parameters of triangular 
distribution for ammunition loading time and maximum time-in-system statistics are 
given below. The sample size of Model-1 is 15 (The determination of sample sizes for 
models are explained in Chapter 4. Section 4.1.1). 
Existing System : Tria (20,25,30)                X  (15) =  533.45  min.    
Changed System : Tria (80,85,90)               X (15) =  1813.95 min.   
As seen above, when we increase the parameters of triangular distribution for 
ammunition loading time to armored vehicles, the maximum time-in-system statistics 
increase from 533.45 min. to 1813.95 min. 
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Secondly, we increase the parameters of triangular distribution for fuel supply 
time to armored vehicles: 
 
Existing System  : Tria (4,7,10)                      X  (15) =  533.45 min.   
Changed System : Tria (40,45,50)                  X  (15) =  1898.04 min.   
Again, as expected, we observe an increase in the maximum time-in-system 
statistics after increasing the parameters of triangular distribution for fuel supply time. 
 
Sensitivity analysis for Model-2 
 
In Model-2, we increase the parameters of triangular distribution for ammunition 
loading time to ammuniton truck and then decrease the velocity of ammunition trucks. 
We expect an increase in maximum time-in-system statistics after we make changes. 
Firstly, we increase the parameters of triangular distribution for ammunition loading time 
to an ammunition truck in our model. The parameters of triangular distribution for 
ammunition loading time to ammuniton truck and the maximum time-in-system statistics 
of existing and changed models are below. The sample size of  Model-2 is 10. 
Existing System  : Tria (65,75,85)                    X   (10) =  469.85  min.        
Changed System : Tria (190,200,210)              X   (10) =  1362.71 min.    
As expected, we observe an increase in maximum time-in-system statistics after 
increasing the parameters of triangular distribution for ammunition loading time to 
ammunition truck. Secondly, we decrease the velocity of ammunition trucks: 
Existing  System : 30 km/hour                     X  (10) =  469.85 min.          
Changed System : 15 km/hour                     X  (10) =  574.38  min.     
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As expected, we observe an increase in maximum time-in-system statistics after 
decreasing the velocity of ammunition trucks. 
 
• Face Validation : The project team members, potential users of the model, and 
the subject matter experts (SMEs) review simulation outputs (eg. numerical results, 
animations, etc.) for reasonableness. They use their estimates and intution to compare 
model and system behaviors subjectively under identical input conditions and judge 
whether the model and its results are reasonable (Hermann, 1967). In our study, we 
include the users of the models and the people who are knowledgeable about systems 
from the beginning of the study. Armored squadran leaders, two maintenance personnel 
from the Armored Branch School, one staff officer from the Land Force Headquarters 
and two expert supply system personnel from the Army Logistics Department were 
included in the model development process. The model outputs were examined by these 
personnel and found reasonable by them. 
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• Cause-Effect Graphing : Cause-effect graphing addresses the question of what 
causes what in the model representation. Causes and effects are first identified in the 
system being modeled and then their representations examined in the model 
specification. 
In Model-1, we increase the number of wheeled vehicles of Headquarters 
Company to evaluate the effect on fuel supply point utilization. There are seventy-five 
wheeled vehicles in Headquarters Company utilizing the supply point at %59.28. We 
increase the number of wheeled vehicles to one hundred and observe the fuel supply 
point utilization  increases to %72.58. 
In Model-2, we observe the effect of increasing the number of ammunition 
trucks. In Model-2, there are 12 ammunition trucks with an ammunition loading unit 
utilization of %64.36. We increase the number of ammunition trucks to 18 and observe 
an increase of the ammunition loading unit utilization to %79.53. Secondly, we observe 
the effect of the increase in number of fuel tankers on utilization of the Headquarters 
Company fuel supply point. In Model-2, there are 3 fuel tankers for Headquarters 
Company and the utilization of the company fuel supply point is %26.35. We increase 
the number of fuel tankers to 6 and observe that utilization of the fuel supply point 
increases to %39.84. 
 
• Review : Detailed examination of input data, key parameters and resulting 
output data are discussed with the personnel who are knowledgeable about modeling the 
functional areas represented in our models. 
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• Visualization and Animation : Animation is an effective method for model 
validation. Displaying graphical images of internal and external dynamic behaviors of 
the models during execution helped us uncover errors. In Figure 3.3 we present a view 
from animation of Model-1. In Figure 3.4 we present statistics collected for Model-1. In 
Figure 3.5 we present a view from animation of Model-2. Finally, in Figure 3.6 we 
present statistics collected for Model-2. 
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Figure 3.3. View from Animation of Model-1 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Statistics Collected for Model-1 
 45 
 
Figure 3.5. View from Animation of Model-2 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Statistics Collected for Model-2 
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CHAPTER 4 
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS 
 
4.1. Factorial Designs and Analysis of Experiments 
One of our aims in this study is to determine the effects of the factors on system 
performances. We know that factorial designs are very efficient and widely used to 
determine the effects of factors on system performances. In our study, we model two 
systems: System-1 (ammunition and fuel supply of an armored battalion at supply 
points) and System-2 (ammunition and fuel supply of an armored battalion by 
ammunition trucks and fuel tankers). We implement 2k factorial design for both models 
to discover the effects and possible interactions of factors on system performance 
according to performance measures. Our performance measures in this study are 
maximum time-in-system and number of destroyed vehicles. Both performance measures 
have vital importance for the military since they affect the course of war. In this chapter, 
we also try to determine which factors and interactions have significant effect on system 
performance. We implement analysis of variance (ANOVA) to find out which factors 
and interactions have significant effects on system performance. In our study, there are 
five factors under consideration. We present these factors and their levels in Table 4.1.     
Table 4.1. Factors and Their Levels  
 Factor Name Low Level High Level 
1 Breakdown 0.02 0.2 
2 Air Attack 0.1 0.8 
3 Artillery Attack 0.1 0.8 
4 Number of Ammunition Depot Loading Points 2 4 
5 Number of Company Fuel Supply Points 1 3 
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 Among them breakdown, air attack and artillery attack are uncontrollable factors. 
Number of ammunition depot loading points and number of company fuel supply points 
are controllable factors. In existing systems, there is one ammunition depot for all 
companies’ ammunition supply. On the other hand, each company has its own fuel 
supply point. The factor levels are determined by asking military experts and by studying 
field manuals related with our study. We implement factorial designs for five factors in 
our study, hence there are 32 design points. We present 32 design points of five factors 
in Appendix-B (Table B.1). In our design points, “1” implies the high factor level and 
“0” implies the low factor level. For example, “10000” means that the first factor is at 
high level and other factors are at low levels. 
 In factorial design, we make the following assumptions: (1) the usual normality 
assumptions are satisfied (2) homogeneity of variances is satisfied and (3) the designs are 
completely randomized. We replicate each of the 32 design points with different seeds 
and use the required sample size for each model to randomize design points completely. 
We determine the sample sizes of models in Section 4.1.1, check the assumption of 
homogeneity of variances in Section 4.1.2 and check the normality of data by examining 
residual plots of performance measures in Section 4.1.3 (Diagnostic Checking). 
 
4.1.1. Determination of Sample Sizes 
 In this section, we determine the number of replications required to obtain the 
point estimates of performance measures with a specified absolute precision and 
confidence level. We use sequential procedure for obtaining sample sizes of our models. 
The sequential procedure is given below (Law and Kelton, 1991). 
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Let  
2
1,1 / 2
( )( , ) n
s nn t
nα
δ α − −=   , be the usual confidence-interval half-length, 
 Choose no≥2, 
1. Make no replications of the simulation and set  n = no            
2. Compute X (n) and  δ(n,α)  from X1,X2,.....,Xn       
3. If δ(n,α ) < β  , use X (n) as the point estimate for µ 
4. Else n = n+1 and go to step 2 
In our study, we would like to obtain a point estimate of maximum time-in-
system with an absolute error β = 45 minutes and a confidence level of 95 percent. We 
would like to obtain a point estimate of the number of destroyed vehicles with an  
absolute error β = 2 vehicles and a confidence level of 95 percent. We obtain the desired 
precision and confidence levels from the experts of the systems. The results of the 
procedure suggest that the number of replications required to obtain the point estimate of 
maximum time-in-system in Model-1 is 15 and the number of replications required to 
obtain the point estimate of number of destroyed vehicles in Model-1 is 6. Hence, we set 
the sample size to 15 for Model-1. Similarly, the number of replications required to 
obtain the point estimate of maximum time-in-system in Model-2 is 7 and the number of 
replications required to obtain the point estimate of number of destroyed vehicles in 
Model-2 is 10. Hence, we set the sample size to 10 for Model-2. 
 
4.1.2. Testing the Assumptions of Analysis of Variances 
We check the assumption of homogeneity of variances by drawing scatter plots of 
variances of performance measures and also by implementing the Bartlett Test. By 
drawing scatter plots of variances of performance measures, we try to determine whether 
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there is correlation of variances or not. We present the scatter plots of variances of 
maximum time-in-system performance measure and number of destroyed vehicles 
performance measure for both models in Appendix-F (Figure F.1 - Figure F.4). It is seen 
in scatter plots that there is no correlation of variances. 
We also implement the Bartlett Test to check the homogeneity of variances. The 
Bartlett Test is a widely used procedure to diagnose the inequality of variances. The 
results of the Bartlett Test according to maximum time-in-system performance measure 
for both models are presented in Table 4.2. The results of the Bartlett Test for the 
number of destroyed vehicles performance measure are presented in Table 4.3. We note 
that the assumption of homogeneity of variances is satisfied in both cases. 
 
Table 4.2. Bartlett Test Results for Maximum Time-in-System Statistics 
 Model-1 Model-2 
Sp2 4390.944 1902.48 
q 10.081 6.01 
c 1.025 1.038 
X02 22.668 13.332 
X0.05,31 44.97 44.97 
Results Pass Pass 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3. Bartlett Test Results for Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics 
 Model-1 Model-2 
Sp2 4.313 4.037 
q 18.241 9.412 
c 1.025 1.038 
X02 40.98 20.878 
X0.05,31 44.97 44.97 
Results Pass Pass 
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4.1.3. Diagnostic Checking 
In this section, we examine residual plots of performance measures to check 
normality assumption. If the model is correct and if the assumptions are satisfied, the 
residuals should be structureless (Montgomery, 1984). The plot of residuals should not 
reveal any obvious pattern. We present residual analysis for performance measures in 
Appendix-D (Table D.1 - Table D.4) and scatter plots of the residuals in Appendix-D 
(Figure D.1 - Figure D.4). As seen in scatter plots, residuals are structureless for both 
models. 
 
4.2. 25 Factorial Design for Maximum Time-in-System Performance 
Measure  
One of our main performance measures is maximum time-in-system. Maximum 
time-in-system performance measure defines the time of the last battalion vehicle which 
completes its supply process and occupies its position at the alert dispersion area. In this 
section, we try to determine significant factors and their interactions. As we have two 
models in our study, we implement ANOVA for both models to determine the significant 
factors and interactions on the performance measure. 
We implement 25 factorial design for these five factors according to maximum 
time-in-system performance measure. We replicate each of the 32 design points 15 times 
for Model-1 and 10 times for Model-2 with different seeds (based on pilot runs which 
determine sample sizes). We present averages and variances of 32 design points of 
Model-1 for maximum time-in-system performance measure in Appendix-B (Table B.2.1 
- Table B.2.4) and averages and variances of 32 design points of Model-2 for maximum 
time-in-system performance measure in Appendix-B (Table B.3.1 - Table B.3.4). In 
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Section 4.2.1, we analyze the results of ANOVA and interpret main effects and 
interactions according to maximum time-in-system performance measure for Model-1. In 
Section 4.2.2, we analyze the results of ANOVA and interpret main effects and 
interactions according to maximum time-in-system performance measure for Model-2. 
 
4.2.1.  ANOVA Results and Interpretation of Main Effects and 
Interactions of  Maximum Time-in-System Measure for Model-1 
In our study, we use SPSS software package to implement ANOVA and we 
present the SPSS output of maximum time-in-system statistics for Model-1 in    
Appendix-C (Table C.5). We also present the effects of factors and ANOVA results of 
maximum time-in-system statistics for Model-1 in Appendix-C (Table C.1). As seen in 
Table C.1, there are four significant factors. The significant factors are breakdown, air 
attack, number of ammunition depot loading points and number of company fuel supply 
points. Breakdown has a positive effect (24.619) on maximum time-in-system 
performance measure. Air attack has a positive effect (22.308) on performance measure. 
The number of ammunition depot loading points has a negative effect (-116.11). The 
number of company fuel supply points has a negative effect (-32.059). As seen from 
results, the number of ammunition depot loading points has the greatest effect on 
performance measure. The only factor that does not have a significant effect on 
performance measure is artillery attack. There are two reasons for the insignificance of 
artillery attack. Firstly, the number of vehicles destroyed by artillery attack is higher than 
that of other factors. When the number of destroyed vehicles increases in model, 
maximum time-in-system decreases because the number of vehicles in queues will 
decrease and less vehicles will be supplied. The increase on maximum time-in-system 
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because of maintenance times of damages caused by artillery attack will not be 
significant when artillery attack probability is at a high level due to the increased number 
of destroyed vehicles. Secondly, artillery attack does not cause delays at time of attack.   
When an enemy air attack occurs the vehicles wait for the end of the attack in a covered 
place if possible. During artillery attack the vehicles continue to march since the enemy 
can not see our movements and there is no need to cover ourself from enemy sight. In our 
models there is a delay block for vehicles whenever air attack occurs and maximum time-
in-system increases due to this delay. There is no such delay for vehicles during artillery 
attack. There are two significant interactions on performance measure. These are 
breakdown-air attack (-13.411) and breakdown-artillery attack (-12.616). 
 
Main Effects of Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-1)
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Figure 4.1. Main Effect Diagram of Significant Factors for Maximum Time-in-System       
                  (Model-1) 
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We explain effects of significant factors via Figure 4.1. As seen in Figure 4.1, the 
number of ammunition loading points and the number of fuel supply points have 
negative effects on performance measure. When the factor level of the number of 
ammunition depot loading points or the number of company fuel supply points is at its 
high level, this causes a decrease in maximum time-in-system statistics. There will be 
fewer vehicles waiting in queues when the number of supply points increases. Although 
an increase in the number of supply points causes a decrease on maximum time-in-
system statistics, it also increases the requirement for more loading units. As seen in 
Figure 4.1, the slope of the line of number of ammunition loading points is greater than 
that of the number of company fuel supply points. An improvement at ammunition depot 
loading points will have a more significant effect on performance measure than an 
improvement at fuel supply points. This is because ammunition loading time is longer 
than fuel supply time and the number of ammunition depot loading points is less than the 
number of fuel supply points for the battalion. The air attack line slope is very close to 
the breakdown line slope. They both have positive effects on performance measure. 
When the factor level of air attack or breakdown is at its high level, this causes  an 
increase in maximum time-in-system statistics. The number of damaged vehicles 
increases when we increase the factor level of air attack or breakdown. The increase in 
the number of damaged vehicles causes more maintenance activities and more 
maintenance activities increases maximum time-in-system statistics. 
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Breakdown-Air Attack Interaction(Model-1)
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Figure 4.2. Interaction Diagram of Breakdown-Air Attack for Maximum Time-in-System     
                  (Model-1) 
 
We explain the interaction between breakdown and air attack via Figure 4.2. The 
continuous line in the diagram describes the change in maximum time-in-system when 
the breakdown factor level is at its high value (0.2) and the air attack factor level is 
changing from its low value (0.1) to its high value (0.8). The dotted line describes the 
change in maximum time-in-system when the breakdown factor level is at its low value 
(0.02) and air attack factor level is changing from its low value to its high value. There is 
interaction between air attack and breakdown since the effect of air attack on 
performance measure depends on the level chosen for breakdown and the effect of 
breakdown on performance measure depends on the level chosen for air attack. Firstly, 
we analyze the effect of air attack on performance measure according to the levels of 
breakdown. In our model air attacks are carried out on vehicle convoys to cause more 
effect. When the breakdown probability is high, then there will be fewer vehicles in 
convoy because the broken ones are being repaired in places that are not in enemy field 
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of view. This means fewer vehicles will be affected by air attacks and the effect of air 
attack on maximum time-in-system will be less. When breakdown probability is low, 
then more vehicles will be in convoy and that means more vehicles will be affected by 
air attack. Secondly, we analyze the effect of breakdown on performance measure 
according to the levels of air attack. When air attack probability is high then there will be 
more vehicles to be repaired. This means vehicle breakdowns will increase and this will 
cause an increase in maximum time-in-system statistics. The effect of breakdown on 
performance measure will be more when air attack probability is high. When air attack 
probability is low then there will be fewer vehicles to be repaired and that means the 
effect of breakdown on performance measure will be less. Then we can say that in 
Model-1, the effect of air attack on maximum time-in-system performance measure 
depends on the level chosen for breakdown and the effect of breakdown on maximum 
time-in-system performance measure depends on the level chosen for air attack. 
Breakdown-Artillery Attack Interaction (Model-1)
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Figure 4.3. Interaction Diagram of Breakdown-Artillery Attack for Maximum Time-in     
        System (Model-1) 
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 We explain the interaction between breakdown and artillery attack via Figure 4.3. 
The continuous line in the above diagram describes the change on maximum time-in-
system when the breakdown factor level is at its high value (0.2) and artillery attack 
factor level is changing from its low value (0.1) to its high value (0.8). The dotted line 
describes the change in maximum time-in-system when breakdown factor level is at its 
low value (0.02) and artillery attack factor level is changing from its low value to its high 
value. The effect of artillery attack on performance measure depends on the level chosen 
for breakdown because when breakdown probability is low, then the number of vehicles 
in convoys will increase and thus increase the number of damaged vehicles due to 
artillery attack. When breakdown factor level is high, then the number of vehicles in 
convoys will decrease, meaning fewer damaged vehicles because of artillery attack. The 
effect of breakdown on maximum time-in-system depends on the level chosen for 
artillery attack because when artillery attack probability is high, then the number of 
broken vehicles will increase. When artillery attack probability is low then the number of 
broken vehicles will decrease. 
          We validate ANOVA results of the maximum time-in-system statistics for Model-1 
by analyzing normal probability effects of performance measure. Analysis of normal 
probability plot effects of maximum time-in-system statistics is presented in Appendix-E 
(Table E.1). Normal probability plot of maximum time-in-system statistics for Model-1 is 
presented in Appendix-E (Figure E.1). The effects of significant factors are farther to the 
other effects in normal probability plot. In Figure E.1, it is seen that there are two 
significant factors which have negative effects on maximum time-in-system and there are 
two significant factors which have positive effects on maximum time-in-system. 
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4.2.2. ANOVA Results and Interpretation of Main Effects and 
Interactions of Maximum Time-in-System Measure for Model-2 
 We present SPSS output of maximum time-in-system statistics for Model-2 in 
Appendix-C (Table C.6). We also present the effects of factors and the ANOVA results 
of maximum time-in-system statistics for Model-2 in Appendix-C (Table C.2). There are 
three significant factors. The significant factors are air attack, number of ammunition 
depot loading points and number of company fuel supply points. Air attack has a positive 
effect (22.079) on performance measure. The number of ammunition depot loading 
points has a negative effect on performance measure (-64.817) and the number of 
company fuel supply points also has a negative effect (-23.958). In Model-2, breakdown 
and artillery attack do not have significant effects on performance measure. Contrary to 
Model-1, breakdown is not a significant factor in maximum time-in-system performance 
measure. In Model-2, most of the vehicles of battalion only march to company alert 
dispersion areas which are close to company garages. In real life, even if there is a 
broken vehicle on the way to an alert dispersion area, it is towed by another vehicle to its 
position at the alert dispersion area and does not cause any delay to the system. In 
Model-2, the probability of breakdown for vehicles which convoy to alert dispersion 
areas from garages is very low. In Model-2, ammunition and fuel supply vehicles convoy 
to supply points and after they are supplied, they convoy to alert dispersion areas. 
Breakdowns do not affect maximum time-in-system significantly in Model-2 contrary to 
Model-1 because the number of supply vehicles is only 21. Artillery attack is also not a 
significant factor in Model-2 because artillery attack causes less vehicle damage due to 
fewer vehicles in convoys and there is no delay during time of artillery attack. There is 
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one significant interaction on performance measure. The significant interaction is 
between breakdown and air attack. 
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Figure 4.4. Main Effect Diagram of Significant Factors for Maximum Time-in-System  
       (Model-2) 
We explain effects of significant factors via Figure 4.4. As seen in Figure 4.4, the 
number of ammunition loading points and the number of company fuel supply points 
have negative effects on performance measure. The increase in the number of supply 
points decreases the number of supply vehicles waiting in queues. As seen in    Figure 
4.4, the slope of the line of number of ammunition loading points is greater than that of 
the number of fuel supply points. It shows that the effect of the number of ammunition 
depot loading points is greater than the effect of the number of company fuel supply 
points. This is because in Model-2, the number of ammunition trucks is more than the 
number of fuel tankers and also the ammunition loading time of an ammunition truck is 
longer than the fuel supply time of a fuel tanker. The enemy air attack has a positive 
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effect on performance measure. The number of damaged vehicles increases when we 
increase the factor level of air attack. The increase in the number of damaged vehicles 
causes more maintenance activities and more maintenance activities increase maximum 
time-in-system statistics. 
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Figure 4.5. Interaction Diagram of Breakdown-Air Attack for Maximum Time-in-System             
                  (Model-2) 
 
The explanations about breakdown-air attack interaction on maximum time-in-
system performance measure for Model-1 is also valid for Model-2 (see Figure 4.5). 
Analysis of normal probability plot effects of maximum time-in-system statistics 
is presented in Appendix-E (Table E.2). Normal probability plot of maximum time-in-
system statistics for Model-2 is presented in Appendix-E (Figure E.2). 
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4.3. 25 Factorial Design for Number of Destroyed Vehicles Performance   
Measure  
The number of destroyed vehicles performance measure is an important statistic 
for the battalion commander since it shows how many vehicles were lost and whether a 
battalion would carry out its mission. If the number of destroyed vehicles were high, then 
the battalion would be unable to carry out its task and this would affect overall success of 
military operations. 
We implement 25 factorial design for five factors given in Table 4.1 for the 
number of destroyed vehicles performance measure. We replicate each of the 32 design 
points 15 times for Model-1 and 10 times for Model-2 with different seeds. We present 
averages and variances of 32 design points of Model-1 in Appendix-B (Table B.4.1 - 
Table B.4.4) and averages and variances of 32 design points of Model-2 in Appendix-B 
(Table B.5.1 - Table B.5.4). In Section 4.3.1 we analyze the results of ANOVA and 
interpret main effects and interactions for the number of destroyed vehicles performance 
measure for Model-1. In Section 4.3.2, we analyze the results of ANOVA and interpret 
main effects and interactions according to the number of destroyed vehicles performance 
measure for Model-2. 
    
4.3.1. ANOVA Results and Interpretation of Main Effects and         
Interactions of Number of Destroyed Vehicles Measure for Model-1 
We present SPSS output of number of destroyed vehicles statistics for Model-1 in 
Appendix-C (Table C.7). We also present the effects of factors and ANOVA results of 
number of destroyed vehicles statistics for Model-1 in Appendix-C (Table C.3). There 
are two significant factors. These significant factors are air and artillery attack. Both 
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significant factors have positive effects on the number of destroyed vehicles performance 
measure. As seen in Table C.3, the effect of artillery attack is greater than the effect of 
air attack on performance measure. Breakdown, number of ammunition depot loading 
points and number of company fuel supply points do not have significant effects on 
performance measure. Breakdown does not have a significant effect on the number of 
destroyed vehicles measure because the probability of vehicle destruction due to 
breakdown is very low in Model-1. Vehicle destruction due to breakdown is a very rare 
event in real life. Ammunition and fuel supply points are highly protected against enemy 
attacks given their importance in real life. They are well constructed so as to withstand 
enemy attacks and their locations are chosen carefully to avoid enemy detection. There is 
also a strong air defense system against enemy planes around supply points. Thus in our 
model, the probability of vehicle destruction at ammunition depot loading points and 
company fuel supply points is very low. There is no significant interaction on 
performance measure. 
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Main Effects of Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistic (Model-1)
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1 : Low level of factors 2 : High level of factors 
Figure 4.6. Main Effect Diagram of Significant Factors for Number of Destroyed         
Vehicles (Model-1) 
  
As seen in Figure 4.6, both significant factors have positive effects on the number 
of destroyed vehicles performance measure. When the factor level of air or artillery 
attack is at its high level, this causes an increase in the number of destroyed vehicles 
statistic. As seen in Figure 4.6, the effect of artillery attack on performance measure is 
greater than the effect of air attack. 
We validate ANOVA results of the number of destroyed vehicles statistics for 
Model-1 by analyzing normal probability effects of performance measure. Analysis of 
the normal probability plot effects of number of destroyed vehicles statistics is presented 
in Appendix-E (Table E.3). Normal probability plot of number of destroyed vehicles 
statistics for Model-1 is presented in Appendix-E (Figure E.3). In Figure E.3, it is seen 
that there are two significant factors which have positive effects on number of destroyed 
vehicles performance measure. 
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4.3.2. ANOVA Results and Interpretation of Main Effects and 
Interactions of Number of Destroyed Vehicles for Model-2 
We present SPSS output for the number of destroyed vehicles statistics of  
Model-2 in Appendix-C (Table C.8). We also present the effects of factors and the 
ANOVA results for Model-2 in Appendix-C (Table C.4). There are two significant 
factors (in Table C.4). As in Model-1, air and artillery attacks are again significant 
factors in Model-2 and both factors have positive effects on performance measure. 
Contrary to Model-1, the effect of air attack in Model-2 is greater than the effect of 
artillery attack as seen in Table C.4. The effect of artillery attack in Model-2 is less than 
the effect of artillery attack in Model-1 since in Model-2, there are fewer vehicles in 
convoys and most of the vehicles remain at alert dispersion areas. It is more difficult for 
artillery weapons to destroy when vehicles are dispersed since artillery attacks are long 
range attacks. On the other hand, airplanes cause more destruction than artillery attack in 
Model-2. Breakdown, number of ammunition depot loading points and number of 
company fuel supply points do not have significant effects on number of destroyed 
vehicles performance measure in Model-2 due to reasons explained in Section 4.3.1 for 
Model-1. There is no significant interaction on performance measure. 
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Main Effects of Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistic (Model-2)
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Figure 4.7. Main Effect Diagram of Significant Factors for Number of Destroyed    
                  Vehicles (Model-2) 
 
As seen in Figure 4.7, when the factor level of air attack or artillery attack is at its 
high level, this causes an increase in the number of destroyed vehicles. They both have 
positive effects on number of destroyed vehicles performance measure. It is also seen 
that in Model-2, the effect of air attack is greater than the effect of artillery attack on 
performance measure. 
Analysis of normal probability plot effects of number of destroyed vehicles 
statistics is presented in Appendix-E (Table E.4). Normal probability plot of number of 
destroyed vehicles statistics for Model-2 is presented in Appendix-E (Figure E.4). In 
Figure E.4, it is seen that there are two significant factors which have positive effects on 
the number of destroyed vehicles performance measure. 
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4.4. Determination of Time Standards of Existing Systems 
 Finally, one of our objectives is to find time standards of the existing systems. In 
our study, we have two systems and we evaluate their performances under enemy threat. 
In military field manuals, there are no time standards of maximum time-in-system 
measure for the existing systems when we consider war conditions. Maximum time-in-
system measure is vital information for a commander since it shows when the military 
activity is over and lets a commander make his plans more reasonable. We think our 
findings in this study will be helpful for commanders in their military planning. As 
obtained in Section 4.1.1, the sample size of Model-1 is 15 and the sample size of 
Model-2 is 10. We run Model-1 fifteen times and collect the maximum-time-in-system 
statistics and then we run Model-2 ten times and collect the maximum time-in-system 
statistics. We then construct confidence intervals by using the SPSS software package to 
find time standards of existing systems under enemy threat. We present confidence 
interval of maximum time-in-system statistics for Model-1 in Table 4.4 and we present 
confidence interval of maximum time-in-system statistics for Model-2 in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.4. Confidence Interval of Maximum Time-in-System Statistics for Model-1 
Test Value = 0 
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 
 
 t df  Mean Difference 
Lower Upper 
A 35.217 14  521.6 489.833 553.366 
 
According to our findings, when we exercise System-1 in real life under enemy 
threat, ammunition and fuel supply activity of an armored battalion will finish within a 
489-553 minute time interval. 
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Table 4.5. Confidence Interval of Maximum Time-in-System Statistics for Model-2 
Test Value = 0 
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference 
 
 t df  Mean Difference 
Lower Upper 
A 27.612 9  473.4 434.616 512.183 
 
According to our findings, when we exercise System-2 in real life under enemy 
threat, ammunition and fuel supply activity of an armored battalion will finish within a 
434-512 minute time interval. We consulted with Turkish military experts about our time 
standards for both Model-1 and Model-2. Their assessments about the findings revealed 
that the outputs are reasonable. They also indicated that our findings could be considered 
relevant in today’s military logistics planning under the current threat environment. 
 
4.5. Conclusion 
 We present the significant factors and interactions on maximum time-in-system 
and number of destroyed vehicles performance measures for Model-1 and Model-2 in 
Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6. Significant Factors and Interactions 
 MODEL-1 MODEL-2 
    Performance 
        Measure 
Factors 
Maximum 
Time-in-System 
Number of 
Destroyed 
Vehicles 
Maximum 
Time-in-System 
Number of 
Destroyed 
Vehicles 
Breakdown Significant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
Air Attack Significant Significant Significant Significant 
Artillery Attack Insignificant Significant Insignificant Significant 
Number of 
Ammunition 
Loading Points 
Significant Insignificant Significant Insignificant 
Number of 
Company Fuel 
Supply Points 
Significant Insignificant Significant Insignificant 
Breakdown-Air 
Attack Interaction Significant Insignificant Significant Insignificant 
Breakdown-
Artillery Attack 
Interaction 
Significant Insignificant Insignificant Insignificant 
 
• In Model-1, breakdown, air attack, number of ammunition depot loading points 
and number of company fuel supply points are significant factors on maximum 
time-in-system performance measure. Air attack and breakdown have positive 
effects on performance measure. Number of ammunition depot loading points 
and number of company fuel supply points have negative effects. Number of 
ammunition depot loading points has the greatest effect on maximum time-in-
system performance measure. There are two significant interactions. These are 
breakdown-air attack and breakdown-artillery attack. 
• In Model-2, air attack, number of ammunition depot loading points and number 
of company fuel supply points are significant factors on maximum time-in-
system performance measure. Air attack has a positive effect and other 
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significant factors have negative effects on performance measure. Number of 
ammunition depot loading points has the greatest effect on maximum time-in-
system performance measure. There is one significant interaction and that is 
between breakdown and air attack. 
• In Model-1, artillery attack and air attack are significant factors on number of 
destroyed vehicles performance measure. Both significant factors have positive 
effects on performance measure. The effect of artillery attack is greater than the 
effect of air attack. There is no significant interaction. 
• In Model-2, air attack and artillery attack are again significant factors on number 
of destroyed vehicles performance measure. Air attack has a greater effect than 
artillery attack and both significant factors have positive effects on performance 
measure. 
• When we consider number of destroyed vehicles performance measure, we see 
that significant factors are the same in Model-1 and Model-2. The only difference 
is that in Model-1, the effect of artillery attack is greater than the effect of air 
attack and in Model-2, air attack has a greater effect. In light of this information, 
we can conclude that commanders must increase their measures against artillery 
attacks whenever they exercise System-1 and they must increase their air defense 
capabilities whenever they exercise System-2. 
• When we consider maximum time-in-system performance measure, we see that 
the only difference between Model-1 and Model-2 according to significant 
factors is breakdown. In Model-1, breakdown is a significant factor but in   
Model-2, it is not. We can conclude that commanders must take necessary 
measures to decrease the number of broken vehicles and to increase the 
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maintenance activity whenever they exercise System-1. Other significant factors 
are the same for both models. Commanders must increase their battalion air 
defense capabilities to avoid significant effects from enemy air attacks. Changes 
at fuel and ammunition supply points are also necessary to decrease maximum 
time-in-system for both models. 
• In our study, we also determine time standards of existing systems which are 
exercised under enemy threat by constructing confidence intervals of maximum 
time-in-system statistics of our simulation models. According to our findings, 
when we exercise System-1 in real life, ammunition and fuel supply activity of an 
armored battalion will finish within a 489-553 minute time interval. When we 
exercise System-2 in real life, ammunition and fuel supply activity of an armored 
battalion will finish within a 434-512 minute time interval. Our findings for 
Model-1 and Model-2 were considered reasonable by military experts. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPLEMENTATION OF RANKING PROCEDURES FOR THE 
REGIONS OF TURKEY 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 In this chapter, we rank the regions of Turkey from most to least critical 
according to performance measures of interest. We only deal with regions which have 
borders with other countries by land or by sea. We do not deal with regions which have 
no borders with neighboring countries since the enemy attack probability is very low for 
these regions. The regions under consideration in our study are: 
(1) Greek border 
(2) Bulgarian border 
(3) Syrian border 
(4) Iranian border 
(5) Iraqi border 
(6) Eastern Black Sea 
(7) Aegean 
(8) Mediterranean 
 
Countries deploy their military units according to the relations with their neighbor 
countries. They deploy more troops and better equipment to the critical regions. The 
relations between countries would change from time to time according to the interests of 
neighboring countries thereby affecting critical regions within Turkey. 
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Turkey is situated in a sensitive part of the world and has sensitive relations with 
some of its neighbors due to its strategic location. When we evaluate the last decade of 
Turkish history, we see that east and southeast regions of Turkey have been the most 
critical regions. We also see that interior regions of Turkey have been the least critical 
regions because of their distance to borders. In our study, we do not include the interior 
regions of Turkey due to low probability of enemy attack in interior regions. 
In our study, we have different parameters of vehicle breakdown and enemy 
attack probabilities for each region. We determine vehicle breakdown probabilities 
according to terrain conditions of regions and the conditions of vehicles in each region of 
interest. Terrain conditions show big differences along the borders of Turkey. For 
example, the terrain conditions in eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey are tougher 
than that of other regions. Other important factor to determine vehicle breakdown 
probability in each region is the condition of vehicles. Newer vehicles are deployed 
along the critical borders. We examine the terrain conditions of regions and the 
conditions of vehicles in each region by consulting military experts and then determine 
vehicle breakdown probability for each region. In our models, the enemy air attack 
probability in each region is determined according to air attack capabilities of 
neighboring countries and also the distance between Turkey and its neighboring 
countries. Air attack probability of Greek war planes are higher than that of other 
neighboring countries since Greece has the most advanced air force among neighboring 
countries. On the other hand, the effect of enemy air attack decreases when the distance 
between a neighboring country and Turkey increases. For example, Russia has a strong 
air force but the effect of its air attack decreases due to its distance. Finally, enemy 
artillery attack probability in each region is also determined according to the enemy 
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artillery attack capabilities and the distance. The effect of artillery attack decreases when 
the distance between Turkey and its neighboring country increases. Among the 
neighboring countries Iran has the biggest artillery attack capability. 
The performance measures of interest are maximum time-in-system and number 
of destroyed vehicles in our study. We aim to rank the regions under consideration 
according to performance measures of interest for both models. This study will help 
commanders determine the most critical regions of Turkey according to performance 
measures of interest and take necessary measures for the critical regions. 
 
5.2. Ranking of Regions by Rinott Procedure 
In this section, we implement the Rinott Procedure (1978) to rank the regions of 
Turkey from the most to least critical according to performance measures of interest. In 
the first stage for each region, we run 15 independent replications and then calculate 
averages and variances of these replications. We then find Ni (required number of 
replications) for each region by the following formula: Ni = max {no, (h*Si / d)2 }. In the 
second stage, we take additional replications (Ni – no) and calculate the average of Ni 
replications for each region. We then select the region with the highest average as the 
most critical region. In our study, we choose no =15 as no >10 is recommended. Our 
desired probability of correct selection (p*) is 0.95 for our performance measures. The 
constant h equals 3.839. In our study, indifference amount value (d) for maximum time-
in-system statistics is 10 minutes and indifference amount value (d) for number of 
destroyed vehicles statistics is 1 vehicle. We decide indifference amount values (d) by 
the help of users of systems. 
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5.2.1. Ranking of Regions by Rinott Procedure According to Maximum 
Time-in-System Performance Measure (Model-1) 
 In this section of study, we present the results of the Rinott Procedure according 
to maximum time-in-system statistics for each region under consideration in Model-1. 
We aim to rank regions from most to least critical according to maximum time-in-system 
statistics. We implement the Rinott Procedure as it was explained in Section 5.2. The 
averages and variances of 15 replications according to maximum time-in-system 
statistics for each region are presented in Appendix-J (Table J.1). After we obtain the 
results of 15 replications for each region, we determine the total sample size (Ni) 
required for each region by using the formula in Section 5.2 and then calculate the 
average of Ni replications for each region. We present the total sample sizes (Ni) required 
for each region and averages of Ni replications for each region in Appendix-J          
(Table J.2).  We rank the regions from most to least critical in Table 5.1 according to the 
Rinott Procedure results. 
 
Table 5.1. Ranking of Regions According to Maximum Time-in-System Statistics 
(Model-1) 
 Regions Averages of Ni Replications 
1 Greek border 592.097 
2 Aegean 565.403 
3 Iranian border 551.042 
4 Iraqi border 540.043 
5 Syrian border 532.187 
6 Bulgarian border 515.393 
7 Eastern Black Sea 500.271 
8 Mediterranean 485.351 
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The most critical region according to maximum time-in-system performance 
measure in Model-1 is the Greek border. This is because the damage probabilities of 
enemy air and artillery weapons along the Greek border are greater than that of other 
regions in Model-1. It is primarily because of the military structure of Greek forces along 
the border. They can intervene in our military activities by their air force and artillery 
weapons from time to time during a possible conflict. Their air force is more advanced 
than that of other neighbors of Turkey and cause more delays in our military activities. 
They can also be effective through the use of their artillery weapons along the border 
because of the short distance between military units. The damages increase maintenance 
activities and maintenance activities increase the maximum time-in-system statistics. 
Terrain conditions along the Greek border also delay our military activities more than 
terrain conditions of other neighbors because of limited movement capabilities along the 
Greek border. The Mediterranean region is the least critical region according to 
maximum time-in-system performance measure because of the low damage probabilities 
of enemy air attacks and artillery attacks in Model-1. It is not possible for any 
neighboring country to have air superiority during a possible conflict over the 
Mediterranean region and it is also difficult for neighboring countries to be effective 
through the use of their artillery weapons due to long distances. Our military activities in 
the Mediterranean region can not be easily disrupted during a possible conflict due to 
reasons above. 
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5.2.2. Ranking of Regions by Rinott Procedure According to Number of 
Destroyed Vehicles Performance Measure (Model-1) 
 In this section, we rank the regions of interest in Model-1 from most to least 
critical according to number of destroyed vehicles statistics. We implement the Rinott 
Procedure as it was explained in Section 5.2. The averages and variances of 15 
replications according to number of destroyed vehicles statistics for each region in 
Model-1 are presented in Appendix-J (Table J.3). We present the total sample sizes (Ni) 
required for each region and averages of Ni replications for each region in        
Appendix-J (Table J.4). We rank the regions from most to least critical in Table 5.2 
according to the Rinott Procedure results. 
Table 5.2. Ranking of Regions According to Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics 
(Model-1) 
 Regions Averages of Ni Replications 
1 Iranian border 5.866 
2 Greek border 5.667 
3 Syrian border 5.133 
4 Iraqi border 4.933 
5 Bulgarian border 4.6 
6 Aegean 4.267 
7 Eastern Black Sea 3.4 
8 Mediterranean 2.067 
 
As seen in Table 5.2, the most critical region is the Iranian border according to 
number of destroyed vehicles performance measure in Model-1. The Greek border 
follows the Iranian border. The destruction probability of artillery weapons along the 
Iranian border is greater than that of other regions in Model-1 because in real life, the 
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number of artillery units in Iran is more than those of other countries under 
consideration. The Iranian Army is bigger than the armies of other neighbors of Turkey 
and they have more military equipment. The Iranian border is not the most critical region 
according to maximum time-in-system performance measure because the number of 
destroyed vehicles is higher along that border than that of other regions and when the 
number of destroyed vehicles statistics increase maximum time-in-system statistics 
decrease in our model. The least critical region according to number of destroyed 
vehicles statistics in Model-1 is the Mediterranean since the destruction probabilities of 
enemy air attacks and artillery attacks are very low. As explained in Section 5.2.1, it is  
difficult for neighboring countries to be disruptive to our military activities in that 
region. Fewer vehicles are affected by enemy air and artillery attacks in the 
Mediterranean region due to long distances between this region and neighboring 
countries. 
 
5.2.3. Ranking of Regions by Rinott Procedure According to Maximum 
Time-in-System Performance Measure (Model-2) 
In this section we implement the Rinott Procedure to rank the regions of interest 
in Model-2 from most to least critical according to maximum time-in-system statistics. 
The averages and variances of 15 replications according to maximum time-in-system 
statistics for each region in Model-2 are presented in Appendix-J (Table J.5). We 
present the total sample sizes (Ni) required for each region and the averages of Ni 
replications for each region in Appendix-J (Table J.6). We rank the regions from most to 
least critical in Table 5.3 according to Rinott Procedure results. 
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Table 5.3. Ranking of Regions According to Maximum Time-in-System Statistics 
(Model-2) 
 Regions Averages of Ni Replications 
1 Greek border 512.125 
2 Iranian border 501.742 
3 Aegean 486.033 
4 Iraqi border 475.893 
5 Bulgarian border 460.619 
6 Syrian border 439.938 
7 Eastern Black Sea 418.153 
8 Mediterranean 405.639 
 
The Greek border is again the most critical region according to maximum time-
in-system performance measure. As explained in Section 5.2.1, the Greek Air Force is 
more advanced than that of other neighboring countries. The damage probability of their 
air weapons is higher than that of others in Model-2. They also have advanced artillery 
weapons, although fewer than the Iranians. Thus, the number of damaged vehicles due to 
air attacks is greater along the Greek border. An increase in the number of damaged 
vehicles results in an increase in maximum time-in-system statistics. The Mediterranean 
is the least critical region according to maximum time-in-system in Model-2 for reasons 
explained in Section 5.2.1 for Model-1. The most and least critical regions according to 
maximum time-in-system performance measure for both models are the same. The Greek 
border is the most critical region for both models and the Mediterranean is the least 
critical region according to maximum time-in-system statistics. 
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5.2.4. Ranking of Regions by Rinott Procedure According to Number of 
Destroyed Vehicles Performance Measure (Model-2) 
In this section, we present the results of the Rinott Procedure according to the 
number of destroyed vehicles statistics for regions in Model-2. We present the averages 
and variances of 15 replications according to the number of destroyed vehicle statistics 
for each region in Model-2 in Appendix-J (Table J.7). We present the total sample sizes 
(Ni) required for each region and averages of Ni replications for each region in 
Appendix-J (Table J.8). We rank the regions from most to least critical in Table 5.4 
according to the Rinott Procedure results. 
  
 
Table 5.4. Ranking of Regions According to Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics 
(Model-2) 
 Regions Averages of Ni Replications 
1 Iranian border 6.066 
2 Greek border 5.867 
3 Iraqi border 5.533 
4 Syrian border 5.266 
5 Aegean 4.867 
6 Bulgarian border 4.667 
7 Eastern Black Sea 3.533 
8 Mediterranean 1.867 
 
As seen in Table 5.4, the most and least critical regions in Model-2  according to 
the number of destroyed vehicles performance measure are the same as in Model-1. The 
Iranian border is the most critical region while the Mediterranean is the least critical due 
to reasons explained in Section 5.2.2. 
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5.2.5. Summary of Rinott Procedure Results  
In this section of study, we summarize the Rinott Procedure results we obtained 
in previous sections of this chapter. The results of the Rinott Procedure for Model-1 are 
presented in Table 5.5 and the results for Model-2 in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.5. Rinott Procedure Results for Model-1 
 Maximum Time-in-System Number of Destroyed Vehicles 
1 Greek border Iranian border 
2 Aegean Greek border 
3 Iranian border Syrian border 
4 Iraqi border Iraqi border 
5 Syrian border Bulgarian border 
6 Bulgarian border Aegean 
7 Eastern Black Sea Eastern Black Sea 
8 Mediterranean Mediterranean 
 
 
As seen in Table 5.5, the rankings are not consistent according to each 
performance measure. We can not identify a single most critical region from the table. 
We can only make conclusions about the rankings of the Mediterranean and Eastern 
Black Sea  regions as they both have the same rankings for each performance measure. 
Therefore, we will implement the Analytic Hierarchy Process in Section 5.3.1 to identify 
a single ranking of regions for Model-1. 
We present the rankings of regions for Model-2 according to performance 
measures of interest in Table 5.6.  
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Table 5.6. Rinott Procedure Results for Model-2 
 Maximum Time-in-System Number of Destroyed Vehicles 
1 Greek border Iranian border 
2 Iranian border Greek border 
3 Aegean Iraqi border 
4 Iraqi border Syrian border 
5 Bulgarian border Aegean 
6 Syrian border Bulgarian border 
7 Eastern Black Sea Eastern Black Sea 
8 Mediterranean Mediterranean 
  
 
As seen in Table 5.6, we can again only make conclusions about the rankings of 
the Mediterranean and Eastern Black Sea regions since these regions are the least critical 
regions according to both performance measures in Model-2. We can not make 
conclusions about the rankings of other regions when we consider both performance 
measures. Therefore, we will implement the Analytic Hierarchy Process in Section 5.3.2 
to identify a single ranking of regions for Model-2. 
 
5.3. Solution of Multiple Objective Problem 
In the previous sections we have implemented the Rinott Procedure to rank the 
regions for Model-1 and Model-2 for each performance measure. The ranking of regions 
are different according to performance measures as seen in Table 5.5 and in Table 5.6. In 
this section, we implement Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to rank regions for both 
models involving both performance measures. Analytic Hierarchy Process is a technique 
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for converting subjective assessments of relative importance into a set of weights. Using 
AHP we first determine the weight of each criterion. The criteria in our study are: 
Criterion-1 (C1) : Maximum time-in-system 
Criterion-2 (C2) : Number of destroyed vehicles 
In order to obtain the weight of each criterion, first we determine a pairwise comparison 
matrix by consulting military experts. A pairwise comparison matrix indicates relative 
importance of criterion (i) to criterion (j). We present the pairwise comparison matrix of 
criteria below. 
 
 
                  
 
 
Next we calculate the relative weight of each criterion. First, we obtain a new 
matrix which is called the normalized matrix by dividing each entry in column (i) of the 
pairwise comparison matrix by the sum of the entries in column (i). We present the 
normalized matrix  of criteria below. 
 
 C1 C2 
    C1 0.545 0.545 
    C2 0.454 0.454 
 
  
 
 C1 C2 
     C1 1 6/5 
     C2 5/6 1 
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We then determine relative weights for each criterion by taking the average of 
entries in each row of the normalized matrix. We present relative weights of each 
criterion  in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.7. Relative Weights of Criteria 
Criterion Weight 
C1 0.545 
C2 0.454 
 
As seen in the normalized matrix, each of the ratio pairwise comparisons given 
by decision-makers is consistent, as each of the normalized columns yields identical 
values. Next we obtain pairwise comparison matrices of regions for each criterion by 
using the Rinott Procedure results we obtained in previous sections. In Section 5.3.1, we 
rank the regions using the AHP technique for Model-1 and in Section 5.3.2, we rank the 
regions using the AHP technique for Model-2. 
 
5.3.1. Ranking of Regions by AHP Technique (Model-1) 
We obtained the relative weights of criteria in Section 5.3. The pairwise 
comparison matrices and normalized matrices of pairwise matrices for each criterion in 
Model-1 are given in Appendix-I. Next, we obtain a utility matrix according to the 
procedure given in Saaty’s book (Saaty, 1988). We present the utility matrix for Model-1 
below. 
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We finally obtain the relative value of each region using the AHP. We present the 
relative values and rankings of regions from most to least critical in Table 5.8. The 
results indicate that the Greek border is the most critical region of Turkey in Model-1 
according to the AHP result. 
 
  
Table 5.8. Ranking of Regions by AHP (Model-1)  
 Regions Relative value 
1 Greek border 0.331 
2 Iranian border 0.195 
3 Aegean 0.141 
4 Iraqi border 0.111 
5 Syrian border 0.108 
6 Bulgarian border 0.071 
7 Eastern Black Sea 0.032 
8 Mediterranean 0.019 
 
 
 C1 C2 
Greek border 0.418 0.228 
Aegean border 0.201 0.071 
Iranian border 0.137 0.265 
Iraqi border 0.101 0.123 
Syrian border 0.077 0.146 
Bulgarian border 0.052 0.095 
Eastern Black Sea 0.031 0.035 
Meditteranean 0.023 0.016 
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5.3.2. Ranking of Regions by AHP Technique (Model-2) 
We present pairwise comparison matrices and normalized matrices of pairwise 
matrices for each criterion in Model-2 in Appendix-I. We present the utility matrix for 
Model-2 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We obtain the relative value of each region using the AHP. We present the 
relative values and rankings of regions from the most to least critical in Table 5.9. 
 
Table 5.9. Ranking of Regions by AHP (Model-2)  
 Regions Relative value 
1 Greek border 0.257 
2 Iranian border 0.239 
3 Iraqi border 0.142 
4 Aegean 0.131 
5 Syrian border 0.085 
6 Bulgarian border 0.082 
7 Eastern Black Sea 0.029 
8 Mediterranean 0.019 
 
 C1 C2 
Greek border 0.303 0.203 
Aegean border 0.156 0.102 
Iranian border 0.243 0.236 
Iraqi border 0.118 0.171 
Syrian border 0.042 0.136 
Bulgarian border 0.078 0.087 
Eastern Black Sea 0.025 0.036 
Meditteranean 0.020 0.018 
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As it in Table 5.9, the Greek border is the most critical region of Turkey in Model-2 
according to the AHP result. 
 
5.3.3. Summary of AHP Results 
In this section of study, we summarize AHP results obtained in previous sections. 
We present the AHP results of Model-1 and Model-2 in Table 5.10. 
 
Table 5.10. AHP Results of Model-1 and Model-2 
 Model-1 Model-2 
1 Greek border Greek border 
2 Iranian border Iranian border 
3 Aegean Iraqi border 
4 Iraqi border Aegean 
5 Syrian border Syrian border 
6 Bulgarian border Bulgarian border 
7 Eastern Black Sea Eastern Black Sea 
8 Mediterranean Mediterranean 
 
 In general, the Greek border is the most critical region of Turkey according to 
both models in our study and the Iranian border the second most critical region. The 
Mediterranean region is the least critical according to both models. The ranking of 
regions according to Model-1 and Model-2 is almost the same. Defense measures along 
critical regions must be well planned and necessary precautions taken at peace time. This 
would include modernization of air defense systems especially along the Greek border 
and more advanced intelligence gathering systems in general. Troop training curriculums 
must create realistic conditions to improve survivability and response times. The findings 
in this study would enhance future military deployment plans by giving commanders 
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insights about the critical regions of Turkey. Resources would be more effectively 
deployed to high risk regions according to our findings. 
The ranking of regions in Turkey was also performed in another study 
(Evaluation of Mobilization and Deployment Plan of a Turkish Armored Battalion via 
Simulation, Müslüm and Sabuncuoğlu, 2002). This study was mentioned in the literature 
review as being the most related study for our purposes. In this study, Müslüm and 
Sabuncuoğlu (2002) develop a simulation model of mobilization and deployment 
activities of one of the armored battalions in the Turkish Army that includes loading of 
vehicles and convoying to assembly area under enemy attack. The authors measure the 
combat readiness of an armored battalion. Specifically, they present a decision tool for 
armored battalion commanders to observe the troop behavior before war. Our study has 
some similarities with their study. These similarities include stochastic events such as air 
and artillery attacks, the same armored battalion structure and analysis of critical regions 
in Turkey. In their study, they also implement Analytic Hierarchy Process to select the 
most critical region in Turkey. The main difference between two studies is that their 
study does not include logistics activities such as ammunition loading and fuel supply. 
Our study attempts to capture this feature of mobilization and deployment planning for a 
Turkish armored battalion. In our study, we not only consider combat modeling activities 
but also military logistics activities. We also have different stochastic events. In their 
study, they include stochastic events such as enemy ambush and minefield. In our study, 
we include stochastic events such as ammunition loading to ammunition trucks, transfer 
of ammunition to armored vehicles and fueling of armored and wheeled vehicles. 
Their results about the ranking of regions in Turkey provide solid comparisons 
with our study results. While they consider ten regions in total (we only consider eight), 
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their findings have similarities with our findings in that the Greek and Iranian borders 
pose the highest threats. In other regions, the results are less consistent but still similar. 
For example, the Eastern Black Sea and Mediterranean regions ranked very low. The 
reason for these differences may be attributed to the fact that their study evaluates a 
different timeframe within the military planning stages, they include no logistics events, 
and the stochastic events for both studies are somewhat different.  
Given the strong similarities between the two studies however, we can say that 
the rankings of each study according to the AHP technique validate each other. It is 
reasonable that our findings about the ranking of regions in Turkey are similar to their 
findings. This is because we simulate the ammunition and fuel supply activities of an 
armored battalion during mobilization and deployment while they simulate the convoy 
activities of  an armored battalion to assembly area during mobilization and deployment. 
Mobilization and deployment activities of an armored battalion include the activities in 
our study and also the activities in their study. Our study mostly includes logistics 
features of mobilization and deployment while their study includes combat features of 
mobilization and deployment. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1. General 
In this study, we analyzed the behaviors of existing ammunition and fuel supply 
systems of an armored battalion before alarm order via simulation. We defined all the 
necessary components of the systems and their interactions which are needed to develop 
the simulation models. The models can easily be modified to represent other types of 
ammunition and fuel supply systems. The  objectives of this study were: (1) To examine 
the behaviors of the existing systems by constructing valid models of systems (2) To 
detect the factors which have significant effects on performance measures (3) To find 
time standards of existing systems, and (4) To rank the regions of Turkey from the most 
to least critical according to performance measures of interest. 
 In our study we have two existing systems. These are : 
• Ammunition and fuel supply of an armored battalion at supply points (System-1) 
• Ammunition and fuel supply of an armored battalion by ammunition trucks and 
fuel tankers at alert dispersion areas (System-2) 
 In this study, the performance measures of interest are maximum time-in-system 
and number of destroyed vehicles. These two performance measures have vital 
importance for commanders since they affect the course of war. We examined the 
existing systems by using these performance measures. We determined the effects of 
factors on performance measures of interest and we ranked the regions of Turkey from 
most to least critical according to performance measures of interest. 
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6.2. Significant Factors and Interactions on Performance Measures 
 In Chapter 4, we implemented 2k factorial design for both models to understand 
the effects of factors and interactions on performance measures of interest. We also 
implemented analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine which factors and interactions 
have significant effects on performance measures. We present the significant factors and 
interactions on performance measures for Model-1 in Table 6.1. We present the 
significant factors and interactions on performance measures for Model-2 in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.1. Significant Factors and Interactions on Performance Measures (Model-1) 
Performance Measures Significant Factors and Interactions 
Maximum Time-in-System 
Breakdown 
Air Attack 
Number of Ammunition Depot Loading Points 
Number of Company Fuel Supply Points 
Breakdown-Air Attack 
Breakdown-Artillery Attack 
Number of Destroyed Vehicles 
Air Attack 
Artillery Attack 
 
As seen in Table 6.1, significant factors on maximum time-in-system 
performance measure in Model-1 are breakdown, air attack, number of ammunition 
depot loading points and number of company fuel supply points. Air attack and 
breakdown have positive effects on performance measure. Number of ammunition depot 
loading points and number of company fuel supply points have negative effects. Number 
of ammunition depot loading points has the biggest effect on maximum time-in-system 
performance measure. There are two significant interactions on maximum time-in-
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system performance measure. These are breakdown-air attack and breakdown-artillery 
attack. 
Significant factors on number of destroyed vehicles performance measure in 
Model-1 are artillery and air attack. Both significant factors have positive effects on 
performance measure. The effect of artillery attack is greater than the effect of air attack. 
There is no significant interaction. 
 
Table 6.2. Significant Factors and Interactions on Performance Measures (Model-2) 
Performance Measures Significant Factors and Interactions 
Maximum Time-in-System 
Air Attack 
Number of Ammunition Depot Loading Points 
Number of Company Fuel Supply Points 
Breakdown-Air Attack 
Number of Destroyed Vehicles 
Air Attack 
Artillery Attack 
 
As seen in Table 6.2, significant factors on maximum time-in-system 
performance measure in Model-2 are air attack, number of ammunition depot loading 
points and number of company fuel supply points. Air attack has a positive effect and 
other significant factors have negative effects on performance measure. The number of 
ammunition depot loading points has the greatest effect on maximum time-in-system 
performance measure. The only significant interaction is between breakdown and air 
attack. 
The significant factors on number of destroyed vehicles performance measure in 
Model-2 are air and artillery attack. Air attack has a greater effect than artillery attack 
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and both significant factors have positive effects on performance measure. There is no 
significant interaction. 
When we consider number of destroyed vehicles performance measure we see 
that significant factors are the same in Model-1 and Model-2. The only difference is that 
in Model-1, the effect of artillery attack is greater than the effect of air attack, whereas in 
Model-2, air attack has a greater effect. In light of this information, we conclude that 
commanders must increase their measures against artillery attacks when  exercising 
System-1, and increase air defense capabilities when exercising System-2. When we 
consider maximum time-in-system performance measure, we see that the only difference 
between Model-1 and Model-2 according to significant factors is breakdown. In    
Model-1, breakdown is a significant factor but in Model-2 it is not. We conclude that 
commanders must take necessary measures to decrease the number of broken vehicles 
and to increase the maintenance activity when exercising System-1.  
 
6.3. Time Standards of Existing Systems 
 One of our objectives in this study is to determine time standards of existing 
systems. Maximum time-in-system measure is vital information for a commander since it 
improves pre-planning and indicates completion of a military activity. We think our 
findings in this study will be helpful to commanders for these reasons. 
In our study, we determine time standards of existing systems which are 
exercised under enemy threat by constructing confidence intervals of maximum time-in-
system statistics of our simulation models. According to our findings, when we exercise 
System-1 in real life, ammunition and fuel supply activity of an armored battalion will 
finish within a 489-553 minute time interval. When we exercise System-2 in real life, 
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ammunition and fuel supply activity of an armored battalion will finish within a 434-512 
minute time interval. 
 
6.4. Ranking of Regions of Turkey   
We implemented the Rinott Procedure to rank the regions of Turkey from most to 
least critical according to each performance measure of interest. The regions under 
consideration have land or sea borders with other countries. We present the rankings of 
regions for Model-1 and Model-2 according to the Rinott Procedure results in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3. Summary Table of Ranking of Regions According to Rinott Procedure Results 
MODEL-1 MODEL-2 
 Maximum 
Time-in-System 
Number of 
Destroyed 
Vehicles 
Maximum 
Time-in-System 
Number of 
Destroyed 
Vehicles 
1 Greek border Iranian border Greek border Iranian border 
2 Aegean Greek border Iranian border Greek border 
3 Iranian border Syrian border Aegean Iraqi border 
4 Iraqi border Iraqi border Iraqi border Syrian border 
5 Syrian border Bulgarian border Bulgarian border Aegean 
6 Bulgarian border Aegean Syrian border Bulgarian border 
7 Eastern Black Sea Eastern Black Sea Eastern Black Sea Eastern Black Sea 
8 Mediterranean Mediterranean Mediterranean Mediterranean 
 
We reach the following conclusions by analyzing Table 6.3.  
• The Greek border is the most critical region according to maximum time-in-
system performance measure for Model-1 and Model-2. 
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• The Iranian border is the most critical region according to the number of 
destroyed vehicles performance measure for Model-1 and Model-2. 
• The Eastern Black Sea and Mediterranean regions are the least critical regions 
according to performance measures of interest for Model-1 and Model-2. 
 
As seen in Table 6.3, we obtained different ranking of regions for each 
performance measure in both models by using the Rinott Procedure. We then 
implemented Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to singularly rank regions according to 
both performance measures. We present the ranking of regions for Model-1 and Model-2 
according to AHP in Table 6.4. 
 
Table 6.4. Summary Table of Ranking of Regions According to AHP Results 
 Model-1 Model-2 
1 Greek border Greek border 
2 Iranian border Iranian border 
3 Aegean Iraqi border 
4 Iraqi border Aegean 
5 Syrian border Syrian border 
6 Bulgarian border Bulgarian border 
7 Eastern Black Sea Eastern Black Sea 
8 Mediterranean Mediterranean 
 
We reach following conclusions by analyzing Table 6.4. 
• The Greek border is the most critical region of Turkey in both models according 
to AHP. The Iranian border is the second most critical.  
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• The Mediterranean region is the least critical region of Turkey in both models 
according to AHP. 
• Measures against possible air and artillery attacks along the Iranian and Greek 
borders must be increased to decrease maximum time-in-system and number of 
destroyed vehicles statistics. Air defense systems especially along the Greek 
border must be modernized. 
• Troop training curriculums must create realistic conditions to improve 
survivability and response times. 
• The findings in this study would enhance future military deployment plans by 
giving commanders insights about the critical regions of Turkey. 
 
6.5. Comparison of System-1 and System-2 
 According to our findings, when we consider number of destroyed vehicles 
performance measure, the only difference between Model-1 and Model-2 is that in 
Model-1, the effect of artillery attack is greater than the effect of air attack and in    
Model-2, air attack has a greater effect. In light of this information, we can conclude that 
commanders must exercise System-2 whenever they know enemy has a strong artillery 
attack capability and they must exercise System-1 whenever they know enemy has a 
strong air attack capability. 
 When we consider maximum time-in-system performance measure, we see that 
the only difference between Model-1 and Model-2 according to significant factors is 
breakdown. In Model-1, breakdown is a significant factor but in Model-2 it is not. We 
can conclude that commanders must exercise System-2 whenever they know vehicle 
breakdown probability is high due to terrain conditions and the conditions of vehicles. 
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 In our study, we determined time standards for each system. According to our 
findings, when we exercise System-1 in real life, ammunition and fuel supply activity of 
an armored battalion will finish within a 489-553 minute time interval. When we 
exercise System-2 in real life, ammunition and fuel supply of an armored battalion will 
finish within a 434-512 minute time interval. System-2 is favorable to System-1 in terms 
of time standards but System-2 is not applicable in all situations. System-2 can not be 
exercised when there is severe weather condition such as heavy rain or snow since 
supply vehicles can have maintenance problems during their travels in such severe 
weather conditions. System-2 is also not applicable for each armored battalion due to 
differences in the structure of armored battalions. Not all armored battalions have enough 
supply vehicles to transport their supply materials. A battalion commander will use either 
technique depending on resources at hand and weather conditions. 
 
6.6. Future Research Topics 
 In our study, we evaluate the ammunition and fuel supply systems of one of the 
armored battalions in the Turkish Army before alarm order. Ammunition and fuel supply 
systems of an armored brigade can be studied as a future research topic. Ammunition and 
fuel supply systems of an infantry battalion or an infantry brigade can also be studied as  
a future research topic. 
 Military equipment and vehicles are complex and very expensive systems. With 
the improvements in technology, the cost of military equipment and vehicles are 
increasing rapidly. In the future research studies, cost criterion should be included. 
 In this study, we only consider two classes of supply materials, ammunition and 
fuel. Future studies could consider other classes of supply materials. 
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APPENDIX-A 
DETAILED FLOWCHARTS FOR MODEL-1 AND MODEL-2  
Ammunition and Fuel Supply of an Armored Battalion at Supply Points 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure A.1. Detailed Flowchart of System-1 
 
Personnel in charge at 
supply points from 
Headquarters Company 
take their equipment 
 
Vehicle crews prepare 
their vehicles to convoy 
to the supply points 
Personnel in charge at 
fuel supply points get 
on  truck to convoy to 
fuel supply points 
Personnel in charge at 
ammunition  depot get 
on  truck to convoy 
ammunition depot 
Convoy to supply 
points 
Does breakdown 
occur during convoy? YES 
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depot for ammunition 
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                    START 
Battalion commander orders for 
ammunition and fuel supply 
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Figure A.1. Detailed Flowchart of System-1 
 
       
                                                              
1
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start to convoy to the 
ammunition depot 
Does breakdown 
occur?   YES 
 
N 
O 
 
Repair 
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NO Move vehicle off road 
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Figure A.1. Detailed Flowchart of System-1 
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2
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Figure A.1. Detailed Flowchart of System-1 
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Ammunition and Fuel Supply of an Armored Battalion by Ammunition Trucks and Fuel Tankers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.2. Detailed Flowchart of System-2 
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Figure A.2. Detailed Flowchart of System-2 
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Figure A.2. Detailed Flowchart of System-2 
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Figure A.2. Detailed Flowchart of System-2        
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APPENDIX-B 
DESIGN POINTS AND RESULTS OF REPLICATIONS FOR EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
 
 
Table B.1. Factor Names and Design Points for Performance Measures 
 
 
Breakdown 
(0.02-0.2) 
 
Air Attack 
(0.1-0.8) 
 
Artillery 
Attack 
(0.1-0.8) 
Number of 
Ammunition 
Loading 
Points(2-4) 
Number of 
Company 
Fuel Supply 
Points 
(1-3) 
 
Design 
Points 
1 - - - - - 00000 
2 + - - - - 10000 
3 - + - - - 01000 
4 - - + - - 00100 
5 - - - + - 00010 
6 - - - - + 00001 
7 + + - - - 11000 
8 + - + - - 10100 
9 + - - + - 10010 
10 + - - - + 10001 
11 - + + - - 01100 
12 - + - + - 01010 
13 - + - - + 01001 
14 - - + + - 00110 
15 - - + - + 00101 
16 - - - + + 00011 
17 + + + - - 11100 
18 + + - + - 11010 
19 + + - - + 11001 
20 + - + + - 10110 
21 + - + - + 10101 
22 + - - + + 10011 
23 - + + + - 01110 
24 - + + - + 01101 
25 - + - + + 01011 
26 - - + + + 00111 
27 + + + + - 11110 
28 + + + - + 11101 
29 + + - + + 11011 
30 + - + + + 10111 
31 - + + + + 01111 
32 + + + + + 11111 
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Table B.2.1. Averages and Variances of 15 Replications for Maximum Time-in-System (Model-1) 
 
 
 
 
Table B.2.2. Averages and Variances of 15 Replications for Maximum Time-in-System (Model-1) 
 
 00000 10000 01000 00100 00010 00001 11000 10100 
1 576.38 601.23 585.37 477.82 360.21 478.52 612.56 455.34 
2 499.68 556.27 498.24 623.56 468.66 499.54 645.23 712.34 
3 481.21 433.89 537.23 522.13 505.03 623.56 572.34 633.24 
4 480.04 655.87 642.75 602.45 424.03 544.52 633.56 533.25 
5 665.37 525.18 574.23 555.62 344.33 427.87 489.56 577.34 
6 526.61 547.77 600.43 611.55 493.67 542.76 456.53 625.76 
7 585.36 680.43 546.83 489.13 470.89 477.73 647.24 595.23 
8 580.04 623.15 652.78 478.23 476.22 442.32 588.35 580.13 
9 489.55 505.14 538.87 569.23 459.49 534.78 613.27 499.15 
10 694.88 598.47 644.56 647.37 343.9 414.54 659.47 513.75 
11 512.92 612.45 626.63 615.33 456.03 503.27 666.97 572.34 
12 574.33 584.98 433.23 549.23 484.57 466.76 701.76 649.34 
13 515.93 602.12 672.23 453.87 498.63 546.34 548.76 686.65 
14 600.04 646.87 555.16 674.47 343.95 545.78 673.66 623.45 
15 520.02 683.16 673.43 600.46 367.52 533.91 624.56 644.56 
Average 553.491 590.465 585.465 564.697 433.142 505.48 608.921 593.458 
Variance 4275.473 4649.523 4736.308 4641.732 3931.467 3081.149 4661.168 5065.209 
 10010 10001 01100 01010 01001 00110 00101 00011 
1 477.23 515.45 449.23 593.54 550.21 444.87 389.67 345.54 
2 456.15 466.23 572.43 423.56 402.76 508.56 542.74 366.77 
3 600.67 543.23 393.52 388.73 399.23 543.22 548.02 501.22 
4 534.27 482.34 523.34 423.13 632.17 601.87 608.03 520.36 
5 488.45 634.26 572.43 534.23 599.77 388.98 499.34 430.43 
6 563.63 443.78 592.56 437.34 478.87 456.76 395.66 383.72 
7 388.34 532.45 499.34 376.23 601.11 399.94 533.76 353.66 
8 431.35 467.23 549.29 455.91 467.34 432.75 549.72 352.76 
9 399.65 644.24 560.23 524.76 505.96 376.45 641.74 401.22 
10 412.34 578.34 383.22 522.45 577.33 412.09 526.55 372.34 
11 478.25 456.34 589.34 412.97 523.96 378.67 562.43 387.34 
12 399.34 449.67 399.23 435.31 599.87 478.65 599.33 376.23 
13 434.15 552.12 577.34 477.23 589.65 477.67 489.01 436.23 
14 456.76 456.23 589.76 512.98 623.05 455.19 455.76 367.23 
15 488.75 505.23 600.27 404.44 639.98 450.03 613.49 398.98 
Average 467.289 515.143 523.435 461.521 546.084 453.713 530.35 399.602 
Variance 3839.646 4248.209 6228.963 3980.613 6340.782 3937.433 5583.935 2732.084 
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Table B.2.3. Averages and Variances of 15 Replications for Maximum Time-in-System (Model-1) 
 
 
 
 
Table B.2.4. Averages and Variances of 15 Replications for Maximum Time-in-System (Model-1) 
 
 11100 11010 11001 10110 10101 10011 01110 01101 
1 499.34 477.23 590.46 566.54 650.34 409.34 500.73 552.18 
2 723.58 486.29 403.23 476.29 567.23 485.17 484.27 682.28 
3 576.34 588.42 499.43 460.23 535.01 356.01 602.91 477.14 
4 401.04 378.87 670.45 509.23 599.18 484.28 625.39 601.15 
5 536.76 480.16 599.24 369.45 467.26 401.93 491.14 553.26 
6 567.87 521.45 655.08 346.45 563.56 388.29 519.08 542.83 
7 623.45 490.84 601.43 582.12 665.24 451.62 476.38 532.13 
8 515.73 501.54 554.33 444.23 453.23 374.28 411.72 541.28 
9 559.34 399.64 623.12 399.84 505.39 353.49 532.83 646.93 
10 484.34 428.93 595.23 488.72 601.51 452.97 401.29 484.28 
11 601.73 501.77 609.86 459.93 627.34 499.17 388.27 688.61 
12 532.59 489.43 622.34 490.72 433.83 383.41 366.39 690.11 
13 619.82 389.09 669.35 437.85 606.83 376.49 432.95 471.27 
14 603.56 515.53 589.45 473.73 616.39 399.15 401.64 501.54 
15 654.65 469.02 590.23 514.23 588.26 343.16 501.28 499.26 
Average 566.676 474.547 591.549 467.971 565.373 410.584 475.751 564.283 
Variance 6038.905 3082.81 4579.11 4167.823 5168.509 2644.945 5847.404 6178.877 
 01011 00111 11110 11101 11011 10111 01111 11111 
1 367.26 458.02 543.92 590.43 376.18 421.28 359.29 430.29 
2 449.91 363.26 379.31 642.16 459.26 376.18 466.29 359.71 
3 502.18 439.31 495.38 570.22 477.28 366.71 437.28 502.69 
4 539.29 491.27 355.87 408.23 389.36 437.83 504.29 533.48 
5 420.15 373.28 517.32 536.28 465.38 430.71 428.39 376.38 
6 363.29 381.26 533.98 640.12 452.36 501.27 440.29 466.39 
7 421.46 436.72 500.12 443.47 364.73 433.27 451.27 399.29 
8 412.26 389.29 462.02 688.24 419.49 401.21 382.38 568.21 
9 374.73 355.82 499.87 563.76 442.27 398.42 452.38 463.38 
10 449.16 462.87 483.28 589.26 395.16 498.29 388.26 571.34 
11 472.16 432.71 563.72 621.28 382.38 462.88 401.29 382.17 
12 388.17 445.25 604.25 573.28 485.29 361.28 398.38 402.47 
13 391.24 348.38 612.71 593.27 492.49 388.29 377.39 482.39 
14 395.25 368.29 533.28 692.36 482.61 404.14 532.29 581.42 
15 353.28 399.26 401.24 655.23 488.19 482.09 573.38 372.19 
Average 419.986 409.666 499.085 587.173 438.162 424.257 439.523 459.453 
Variance 2890.186 2029.363 5639.065 6374.487 2107.91 2075.031 3658.077 6094.017 
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Table B.3.1. Averages and Variances of 10 Replications for Maximum Time-in-System (Model-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.3.2. Averages and Variances of 10 Replications for Maximum Time-in-System (Model-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 00000 10000 01000 00100 00010 00001 11000 10100 
1 407.75 430.91 422.47 403.76 298.44 430.69 442.62 425.78 
2 429.16 411.53 430.41 409.23 343.06 406.36 402.72 433.27 
3 389.32 389.95 458.55 435.49 385.57 406.88 462.92 352.65 
4 426.6 375.54 435.78 366.43 339.55 403.84 369.31 418.92 
5 403.22 347.88 500.19 432.41 360.61 418.74 428.63 500.11 
6 383.98 415.54 393.71 372.72 334.81 320.36 517.37 432.35 
7 514.43 430.67 428.21 427.48 320.79 346.51 512.84 412.94 
8 404.11 445.34 341.81 352.11 362.71 331.83 433.56 385.52 
9 380.61 477.75 420.91 467.91 366.94 423.71 429.19 428.14 
10 363.51 402.06 511.15 431.37 399.31 408.16 481.72 377.63 
Average 410.269 412.717 434.319 409.891 351.179 389.708 448.088 416.731 
Variance 1751.454 1352.678 2379.008 1327.395 904.8489 1646.217 2176.095 1590.017 
 10010 10001 01100 01010 01001 00110 00101 00011 
1 382.71 442.29 423.92 360.46 428.82 369.82 425.72 306.01 
2 363.27 321.07 485.11 302.47 389.72 442.53 349.73 279.76 
3 396.83 389.78 404.02 412.36 409.42 320.17 406.37 367.24 
4 336.63 465.76 412.19 440.66 372.11 342.18 408.09 325.94 
5 386.52 389.43 386.98 395.49 408.78 368.74 332.82 360.61 
6 312.49 409.29 407.17 362.83 507.72 361.64 403.28 280.52 
7 389.74 411.23 427.43 381.03 414.62 351.28 366.32 292.43 
8 353.21 409.83 516.62 388.42 347.18 319.43 411.53 350.37 
9 327.45 427.19 502.73 337.63 452.17 338.07 358.63 345.82 
10 301.29 398.64 409.13 300.61 442.29 362.21 421.54 310.53 
Average 355.014 406.451 437.531 368.196 417.283 357.607 388.403 321.923 
Variance 1175.321 1465.886 2122.888 2047.874 2001.153 1226.8 1101.817 1076.837 
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Table B.3.3. Averages and Variances of 10 Replications for Maximum Time-in-System (Model-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.3.4. Averages and Variances of 10 Replications for Maximum Time-in-System (Model-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11100 11010 11001 10110 10101 10011 01110 01101 
1 492.72 317.72 365.29 358.92 322.42 299.42 375.12 382.15 
2 362.72 414.26 482.73 444.34 426.87 354.81 446.04 355.18 
3 511.82 386.63 418.72 355.71 358.29 384.15 432.72 426.98 
4 508.38 372.52 398.36 441.73 428.97 343.29 389.79 381.03 
5 442.31 400.42 419.02 365.83 415.82 289.01 442.16 418.28 
6 421.27 363.61 462.72 347.02 389.13 348.32 326.76 424.63 
7 379.29 309.73 347.26 353.86 335.77 388.82 303.02 358.28 
8 412.82 362.09 400.62 326.56 400.92 313.64 342.42 385.29 
9 412.84 411.82 458.38 300.19 409.09 284.03 376.27 417.01 
10 501.76 380.01 439.11 332.98 443.63 290.18 324.07 527.27 
Average 444.593 371.881 419.221 362.714 393.091 329.567 375.837 407.61 
Variance 3078.572 1272.226 1858.107 2156.073 1702.585 1566.641 2696.183 2468.983 
 01011 00111 11110 11101 11011 10111 01111 11111 
1 376.19 341.71 362.83 389.21 362.08 413.28 348.28 372.72 
2 289.53 331.23 372.19 408.93 316.74 358.92 418.09 269.12 
3 326.76 287.45 445.29 497.03 382.19 344.54 283.38 377.21 
4 339.04 317.46 302.15 513.27 293.02 302.79 327.08 456.03 
5 319.61 439.29 328.39 439.29 288.42 283.47 326.28 362.23 
6 273.93 352.18 401.33 404.21 345.81 263.98 397.81 361.79 
7 398.18 278.38 364.03 376.82 396.18 279.18 301.03 298.76 
8 302.17 365.08 386.72 405.26 388.92 338.81 437.21 336.36 
9 287.16 327.19 422.02 501.42 376.02 347.92 352.02 417.23 
10 402.18 310.37 432.78 512.61 303.87 364.54 313.28 352.79 
Average 331.475 335.034 381.773 444.805 345.325 329.743 350.446 360.424 
Variance 2173.537 2064.189 2068.661 3051.071 1730.949 2157.908 2645.032 2842.416 
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Table B.4.1. Averages and Variances of 15 Replications for Number of Destroyed Vehicles(Model-1) 
 
 
 
 
 Table B.4.2 Averages and Variances of 15 Replications for Number of Destroyed Vehicles(Model-1) 
 
 00000 10000 01000 00100 00010 00001 11000 10100 
1 2 4 5 7 3 4 9 7 
2 1 3 8 8 2 2 5 10 
3 3 0 3 4 3 1 6 5 
4 4 1 3 8 5 3 6 3 
5 1 0 5 5 2 2 4 11 
6 0 1 4 8 5 1 8 7 
7 1 1 3 5 1 3 6 6 
8 1 2 10 3 0 0 4 9 
9 3 3 4 9 4 1 3 8 
10 1 0 4 6 3 2 5 8 
11 3 5 4 6 1 1 4 4 
12 1 0 9 8 0 2 8 7 
13 0 4 9 4 2 1 6 8 
14 2 2 4 10 3 1 5 3 
15 3 3 9 3 1 4 7 8 
Average 1.733 1.933 5.6 6.266 2.333 1.866 5.733 6.933 
Variance 1.495 2.780 6.685 4.923 2.523 1.409 2.923 5.638 
 10010 10001 01100 01010 01001 00110 00101 00011 
1 3 3 11 5 5 4 8 2 
2 1 5 14 7 8 10 6 4 
3 2 1 7 3 3 5 5 0 
4 4 2 11 6 2 7 6 1 
5 3 0 9 4 4 6 3 3 
6 5 1 8 8 5 6 8 2 
7 1 1 8 5 7 7 9 3 
8 2 2 11 6 5 3 6 0 
9 3 3 10 7 4 9 7 1 
10 2 1 7 9 5 8 4 2 
11 1 0 15 3 3 4 7 2 
12 1 2 10 1 7 9 8 0 
13 2 4 11 6 9 5 5 2 
14 1 1 9 6 8 8 9 1 
15 0 3 8 9 8 4 5 2 
Average 2.066 1.933 9.933 5.666 5.533 6.333 6.4 1.666 
Variance 1.780 2.066 5.495 5.095 4.695 4.666 3.257 1.380 
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   Table B.4.3. Averages and Variances of 15 Replications for Number of Destroyed Vehicles(Model-1) 
 
 
 
 
Table B.4.4 Averages and Variances of 15 Replications for Number of Destroyed Vehicles(Model-1) 
 
 11100 11010 11001 10110 10101 10011 01110 01101 
1 9 8 7 9 6 3 10 9 
2 14 2 5 7 9 5 13 14 
3 8 7 5 5 5 1 7 8 
4 9 6 6 7 7 0 10 11 
5 12 4 2 8 8 0 8 7 
6 8 6 9 8 9 1 9 9 
7 7 6 4 5 4 0 10 8 
8 12 4 5 3 2 2 11 11 
9 10 2 3 8 6 3 9 10 
10 7 5 5 5 5 1 7 7 
11 14 4 4 6 6 5 14 13 
12 12 7 7 8 8 1 12 12 
13 14 6 6 4 4 5 11 10 
14 10 9 5 9 10 2 8 9 
15 8 7 7 3 4 1 7 8 
Average 10.266 5.533 5.333 6.333 6.2 2 9.733 9.733 
Variance 6.495 4.123 3.095 4.238 5.171 3.285 4.780 4.495 
 01011 00111 11110 11101 11011 10111 01111 11111 
1 5 5 9 9 6 6 10 9 
2 6 6 15 15 7 9 12 11 
3 3 5 8 8 2 5 8 13 
4 2 8 10 10 3 7 11 10 
5 5 5 9 9 5 5 9 9 
6 4 7 10 8 4 10 5 13 
7 3 5 8 7 3 5 8 8 
8 9 3 11 12 9 3 9 7 
9 4 8 9 10 4 8 13 12 
10 5 6 7 8 6 6 9 11 
11 4 10 14 13 7 7 13 13 
12 9 8 9 13 7 8 10 14 
13 10 4 12 11 8 4 11 14 
14 4 9 9 7 5 9 9 10 
15 9 3 7 12 10 5 8 9 
Average 5.467 6.133 9.8 10.133 5.733 6.467 9.667 10.867 
Variance 6.552 4.552 5.457 5.980 5.352 4.123 4.523 4.980 
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Table B.5.1. Averages and Variances of 10 Replications for Number of Destroyed Vehicles(Model-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.5.2. Averages and Variances of 10 Replications for Number of Destroyed Vehicles(Model-2) 
 
 
 
 
 00000 10000 01000 00100 00010 00001 11000 10100 
1 3 2 9 4 2 1 8 5 
2 2 1 5 3 0 0 5 7 
3 1 2 4 7 2 2 4 6 
4 3 3 6 6 2 4 6 7 
5 3 4 10 7 4 1 9 2 
6 4 3 7 9 1 4 8 5 
7 2 3 4 8 2 3 5 8 
8 0 0 6 4 4 2 4 4 
9 1 2 8 6 4 3 11 5 
10 2 3 7 5 1 0 7 9 
Average 2.1 2.3 6.6 5.9 2.2 2 6.7 5.8 
Variance 1.433 1.344 4.044 3.655 1.955 2.222 5.344 4.177 
 10010 10001 01100 01010 01001 00110 00101 00011 
1 3 1 7 8 5 2 3 3 
2 0 2 10 3 3 6 5 0 
3 2 4 12 7 8 5 6 2 
4 3 2 13 4 5 7 8 2 
5 3 5 8 5 4 7 7 1 
6 2 2 14 9 5 5 4 5 
7 4 2 8 7 9 10 9 4 
8 0 0 11 6 8 4 3 1 
9 1 2 10 8 10 6 6 4 
10 4 3 8 6 5 5 7 0 
Average 2.2 2.3 10.1 6.3 6.2 5.7 5.8 2.2 
Variance 2.177 2.011 5.655 3.566 5.511 4.455 4.177 3.066 
 116 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.5.3. Averages and Variances of 10 Replications for Number of Destroyed Vehicles(Model-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B.5.4. Averages and Variances of 10 Replications for Number of Destroyed Vehicles(Model-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11100 11010 11001 10110 10101 10011 01110 01101 
1 7 7 6 3 5 3 8 8 
2 10 5 7 5 3 0 9 9 
3 12 4 5 8 6 1 14 14 
4 11 7 8 6 6 2 7 12 
5 8 5 8 7 8 1 8 8 
6 13 7 6 5 9 4 12 7 
7 9 8 5 9 7 1 9 10 
8 9 4 2 3 3 6 13 13 
9 12 10 9 8 7 4 10 10 
10 13 8 8 5 5 1 8 9 
Average 10.4 6.5 6.4 5.9 5.9 2.3 9.8 10 
Variance 4.488 3.833 4.266 4.322 3.877 3.566 5.733 5.333 
 01011 00111 11110 11101 11011 10111 01111 11111 
1 2 4 8 7 8 4 10 8 
2 6 4 9 11 5 4 9 11 
3 5 5 12 14 4 5 8 15 
4 9 7 9 12 8 6 14 12 
5 7 5 8 8 9 8 8 9 
6 5 5 15 14 10 7 14 13 
7 8 9 8 9 7 6 8 10 
8 3 4 13 10 5 3 11 9 
9 9 6 9 12 8 8 13 12 
10 7 5 8 8 6 5 10 14 
Average 6.1 5.4 9.9 10.5 7 5.6 10.5 11.3 
Variance 5.655 2.488 6.322 6.277 3.777 2.933 5.833 5.344 
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APPENDIX-C 
ANOVA TABLES OF THE PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 
 
 
 
Table C.1. Effects and ANOVA Results for Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-1) 
 
Source of 
Variation Effect SSx df MSx Fo  
10000 24.619 72735.851 1 72735.851 16.565 Significant 
01000 22.308 59719.855 1 59719.855 13.601 Significant 
00100 7.714 7141.930 1 7141.930 1.627 Insignificant 
00010 -116.111 1617837.263 1 1617837.263 368.449 Significant 
00001 -32.059 123340.591 1 123340.591 28.09 Significant 
11000 -13.411 21583.932 1 21583.932 4.916 Significant 
10100 -12.616 17107.118 1 17107.118 3.896 Significant 
10010 -6.064 4413.258 1 4413.258 1.005 Insignificant 
10001 -2.529 768.057 1 768.057 0.175 Insignificant 
01100 -9.071 9875.053 1 9875.053 2.249 Insignificant 
01010 2.917 1021.242 1 1021.242 0.233 Insignificant 
01001 1.269 181.751 1 181.751 0.041 Insignificant 
00110 0.785 33.096 1 33.096 0.008 Insignificant 
00101 10.471 11398.437 1 11398.437 2.596 Insignificant 
00011 -9.413 10633.113 1 10633.113 2.422 Insignificant 
11100 7.916 7411.036 1 7411.036 1.688 Insignificant 
11010 -1.508 273.159 1 273.159 0.062 Insignificant 
11001 2.955 1048.020 1 1048.020 0.239 Insignificant 
10110 -1.16 161.751 1 161.751 0.037 Insignificant 
10101 0.384 17.787 1 17.787 0.004 Insignificant 
10011 -1.105 1.342 1 1.342 0.01 Insignificant 
01110 11.097 12752.625 1 12752.625 2.905 Insignificant 
01101 3.548 1510.88 1 1510.88 0.344 Insignificant 
01011 -11.383 12937.01 1 12937.01 2.946 Insignificant 
00111 -11.903 14266.357 1 14266.357 3.249 Insignificant 
11110 3.017 1092.637 1 1092.637 0.249 Insignificant 
11101 -6.749 5465.88 1 5465.88 1.245 Insignificant 
11011 0.116 1.640 1 1.640 0.001 Insignificant 
10111 1.483 263.974 1 263.974 0.06 Insignificant 
01111 -3.601 1556.208 1 1556.208 0.354 Insignificant 
11111 2.742 902.666 1 902.666 0.206 Insignificant 
Error  1967142.944 448 4390.944   
Total  3980830.512 479    
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Table C.2. Effects and ANOVA Results for Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of 
Variation Effect SSx df MSx Fo  
10000 9.433 6741.519 1 6741.519 3.576 Insignificant 
01000 22.079 38998.579 1 38998.579 20.687 Significant 
00100 6.194 3069.994 1 3069.994 1.628 Insignificant 
00010 -64.817 336099.479 1 336099.479 178.282 Significant 
00001 -23.958 45919.340 1 45919.340 24.358 Significant 
11000 -10.047 7533.628 1 7533.628 3.994 Significant 
10100 -6.387 3235.483 1 3235.483 1.716 Insignificant 
10010 -3.84 1179.648 1 1179.648 0.626 Insignificant 
10001 3.347 896.527 1 896.527 0.476 Insignificant 
01100 4.146 1375.477 1 1375.477 0.73 Insignificant 
01010 -4.257 1449.764 1 1449.764 0.769 Insignificant 
01001 -1.182 111.935 1 111.935 0.059 Insignificant 
00110 3.682 1084.864 1 1084.864 0.575 Insignificant 
00101 1.818 264.446 1 264.446 0.14 Insignificant 
00011 -3.574 1022.379 1 1022.379 0.542 Insignificant 
11100 5.225 2294.604 1 2294.604 1.217 Insignificant 
11010 -1.412 159.5 1 159.5 0.085 Insignificant 
11001 2.653 563.232 1 563.232 0.299 Insignificant 
10110 -1.167 108.951 1 108.951 0.058 Insignificant 
10101 -0.644 33.243 1 33.243 0.018 Insignificant 
10011 -2.395 459.026 1 459.026 0.243 Insignificant 
01110 -1.123 100.89 1 100.89 0.054 Insignificant 
01101 4.21 1418.517 1 1418.517 0.752 Insignificant 
01011 1.211 117.443 1 117.443 0.062 Insignificant 
00111 0.143 1.656 1 1.656 0.01 Insignificant 
11110 -0.667 35.591 1 35.591 0.019 Insignificant 
11101 3.187 812.621 1 812.621 0.431 Insignificant 
11011 -0.053 0.232 1 0.232 0.001 Insignificant 
10111 -1.896 287.775 1 287.775 0.153 Insignificant 
01111 -2.038 332.479 1 332.479 0.176 Insignificant 
11111 -2.176 379.016 1 379.016 0.201 Insignificant 
Error  542941.281 288 1885.213   
Total  988056.122 319    
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Table C.3. Effects and ANOVA Results for Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of 
Variation Effect SSx df MSx Fo  
10000 0.2 4.800 1 4.800 1.113 Insignificant 
01000 3.633 1584.133 1 1584.133 367.259 Significant 
00100 4.441 2367.408 1 2367.408 548.851 Significant 
00010 0.016 3.333E-02 1 3.333E-02 0.008 Insignificant 
00001 -0.066 .533 1 .533 0.124 Insignificant 
11000 0.058 .408 1 .408 0.095 Insignificant 
10100 0.15 2.700 1 2.700 0.626 Insignificant 
10010 0.025 7.50E-02 1 7.50E-02 0.017 Insignificant 
10001 0.075 0.675 1 0.675 0.156 Insignificant 
01100 0.001 0.833 1 0.833 0.193 Insignificant 
01010 0.008 8.33E-03 1 8.33E-03 0.002 Insignificant 
01001 0.091 1.008 1 1.008 0.234 Insignificant 
00110 -0.083 0.833 1 0.833 0.193 Insignificant 
00101 0.066 0.533 1 0.533 0.124 Insignificant 
00011 0.091 1.008 1 1.008 0.234 Insignificant 
11100 0.091 1.008 1 1.008 0.234 Insignificant 
11010 0.066 0.533 1 0.533 0.124 Insignificant 
11001 0.083 0.833 1 0.833 0.193 Insignificant 
10110 0.025 7.50E-02 1 7.50E-02 0.017 Insignificant 
10101 0.008 8.33E-03 1 8.33E-03 0.002 Insignificant 
10011 0.233 6.533 1 6.533 1.515 Insignificant 
01110 0.058 0.408 1 0.408 0.095 Insignificant 
01101 0.075 0.675 1 0.675 0.156 Insignificant 
01011 0.133 2.133 1 2.133 0.495 Insignificant 
00111 0.141 2.408 1 2.408 0.558 Insignificant 
11110 0.016 3.33E-02 1 3.33E-02 0.008 Insignificant 
11101 0.133 2.133 1 2.133 0.495 Insignificant 
11011 -0.008 8.33E-03 1 8.33E-03 0.002 Insignificant 
10111 0.05 0.300 1 0.300 0.070 Insignificant 
01111 -0.033 0.133 1 0.133 0.031 Insignificant 
11111 -0.008 8.33E-03 1 8.33E-03 0.002 Insignificant 
Error  1932.400 448 4.313   
Total  5913.792 479    
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Table C.4. Effects and ANOVA Results for Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source of 
Variation Effect SSx df MSx Fo 
 
10000 0.218 3.828 1 3.828 0.948 Insignificant 
01000 4.381 1535.628 1 1535.628 380.374 Significant 
00100 3.656 1069.453 1 1069.453 264.903 Significant 
00010 -0.006 3.125E-03 1 3.125E-03 0.001 Insignificant 
00001 0.068 0.378 1 0.378 0.094 Insignificant 
11000 0.168 2.278 1 2.278 0.564 Insignificant 
10100 0.043 0.153 1 0.153 0.038 Insignificant 
10010 0.056 0.253 1 0.253 0.063 Insignificant 
10001 0.131 1.378 1 1.378 0.341 Insignificant 
01100 0.181 2.628 1 2.628 0.651 Insignificant 
01010 0.068 0.378 1 0.378 0.094 Insignificant 
01001 0.143 1.653 1 1.653 0.409 Insignificant 
00110 -0.031 7.812E-02 1 7.812E-02 0.019 Insignificant 
00101 0.118 1.128 1 1.128 0.279 Insignificant 
00011 0.131 1.378 1 1.378 0.341 Insignificant 
11100 -0.006 3.125E-03 1 3.125E-03 0.001 Insignificant 
11010 0.056 0.253 1 0.253 0.063 Insignificant 
11001 0.081 0.528 1 0.528 0.131 Insignificant 
10110 0.006 3.125E-03 1 3.125E-03 0.001 Insignificant 
10101 0.006 3.125E-03 1 3.125E-03 0.001 Insignificant 
10011 0.093 0.703 1 0.703 0.174 Insignificant 
01110 0.093 0.703 1 0.703 0.174 Insignificant 
01101 0.193 3.003 1 3.003 0.744 Insignificant 
01011 0.256 5.253 1 5.253 1.301 Insignificant 
00111 0.056 0.253 1 0.253 0.063 Insignificant 
11110 -0.093 0.703 1 0.703 0.174 Insignificant 
11101 0.006 0.0031 1 0.0031 0.001 Insignificant 
11011 0.043 0.153 1 0.153 0.038 Insignificant 
10111 -0.056 0.253 1 0.253 0.063 Insignificant 
01111 0.081 0.528 1 0.528 0.131 Insignificant 
11111 0.043 0.153 1 0.153 0.038 Insignificant 
Error  1162.700 288 4.037   
Total  3795.797 319    
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Table C.5. SPSS Output of Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-1) 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
A 72735.851 1 72735.851 16.565 .000 .036 16.565 .982 
B 59719.855 1 59719.855 13.601 .000 .029 13.601 .957 
C 7141.930 1 7141.930 1.627 .203 .004 1.627 .247 
D 1617837.263 1 1617837.263 368.449 .000 .451 368.449 1.000 
E 123340.591 1 123340.591 28.090 .000 .059 28.090 1.000 
A * B 21583.932 1 21583.932 4.916 .027 .011 4.916 .600 
A * C 17107.118 1 17107.118 3.896 .049 .009 3.896 .519 
B * C 9875.053 1 9875.053 2.249 .134 .005 2.249 .322 
A * B * C 7411.036 1 7411.036 1.688 .195 .004 1.688 .254 
A * D 4413.258 1 4413.258 1.005 .317 .002 1.005 .170 
B * D 1021.242 1 1021.242 .233 .630 .001 .233 .077 
A * B * D 273.159 1 273.159 .062 .803 .000 .062 .057 
C * D 33.096 1 33.096 .008 .931 .000 .008 .051 
A * C * D 161.751 1 161.751 .037 .848 .000 .037 .054 
B * C * D 12752.625 1 12752.625 2.905 .173 .005 2.905 .401 
A * B * C * D 1092.637 1 1092.637 .249 .618 .001 .249 .079 
A * E 768.057 1 768.057 .175 .676 .000 .175 .070 
B * E 181.751 1 181.751 .041 .842 .000 .041 .055 
A * B * E 1048.020 1 1048.020 .239 .625 .001 .239 .078 
C * E 11398.437 1 11398.437 2.596 .106 .006 2.596 .363 
A * C * E 17.787 1 17.787 .004 .949 .000 .004 .050 
B * C * E 1510.880 1 1510.880 .344 .558 .001 .344 .090 
A * B * C * E 5465.880 1 5465.880 1.245 .265 .003 1.245 .200 
D * E 10633.113 1 10633.113 2.422 .120 .005 2.422 .342 
A * D * E 1.342 1 1.342 .000 .986 .000 .000 .050 
B * D * E 12937.010 1 12937.010 2.946 .087 .007 2.946 .403 
A * B * D * E 1.640 1 1.640 .000 .985 .000 .000 .050 
C * D * E 14266.357 1 14266.357 3.249 .072 .007 3.249 .436 
A * C * D * E 263.974 1 263.974 .060 .806 .000 .060 .057 
B * C * D * E 1556.208 1 1556.208 .354 .552 .001 .354 .091 
A * B * C * D * E 902.666 1 902.666 .206 .650 .000 .206 .074 
Error 1967142.944 448 4390.944      
Corrected Total 3980830.512 479       
A : Vehicle Breakdown  B : Air Attack        C : Artillery Attack 
D : Number of Ammunition Depot Loading Points  E : Number of Company Fuel Supply Points 
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 Table C.6. SPSS Output of Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-2) 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
A 6741.519 1 6741.519 3.576 .053 .012 3.576 .461 
B 38998.579 1 38998.579 20.687 .000 .067 20.687 .995 
C 3069.994 1 3069.994 1.628 .203 .006 1.628 .246 
D 336099.479 1 336099.479 178.282 .000 .382 178.282 1.000 
E 45919.340 1 45919.340 24.358 .000 .078 24.358 .998 
A * B 7533.628 1 7533.628 3.994 .042 .016 3.994 .498 
A * C 3235.483 1 3235.483 1.716 .192 .007 1.716 .259 
B * C 1375.477 1 1375.477 .730 .394 .003 .730 .136 
A * B * C 2294.604 1 2294.604 1.217 .254 .005 1.217 .188 
A * D 1179.648 1 1179.648 .626 .430 .002 .626 .124 
B * D 1449.764 1 1449.764 .769 .381 .003 .769 .141 
A * B * D 159.500 1 159.500 .085 .771 .000 .085 .060 
C * D 1084.864 1 1084.864 .575 .449 .002 .575 .118 
A * C * D 108.951 1 108.951 .058 .810 .000 .058 .057 
B * C * D 100.890 1 100.890 .054 .817 .000 .054 .056 
A * B * C * D 35.591 1 35.591 .019 .891 .000 .019 .052 
A * E 896.527 1 896.527 .476 .491 .002 .476 .106 
B * E 111.935 1 111.935 .059 .808 .000 .059 .057 
A * B * E 563.232 1 563.232 .299 .585 .001 .299 .085 
C * E 264.446 1 264.446 .140 .708 .000 .140 .066 
A * C * E 33.243 1 33.243 .018 .894 .000 .018 .052 
B * C * E 1418.517 1 1418.517 .752 .386 .003 .752 .139 
A * B * C * E 812.621 1 812.621 .431 .512 .001 .431 .100 
D * E 1022.379 1 1022.379 .542 .462 .002 .542 .114 
A * D * E 459.026 1 459.026 .243 .622 .001 .243 .078 
B * D * E 117.443 1 117.443 .062 .803 .000 .062 .057 
A * B * D * E .232 1 .232 .000 .991 .000 .000 .050 
C * D * E 1.656 1 1.656 .001 .976 .000 .001 .050 
A * C * D * E 287.775 1 287.775 .153 .696 .001 .153 .068 
B * C * D * E 332.479 1 332.479 .176 .675 .001 .176 .070 
A * B * C * D * E 379.016 1 379.016 .201 .654 .001 .201 .073 
Error 542941.281 288 1885.213      
Corrected Total 988056.122 319       
A : Vehicle Breakdown  B : Air Attack         C : Artillery Attack 
D : Number of Ammunition Depot Loading Points   E : Number of Company Fuel Supply Points 
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 Table C.7. SPSS Output of Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-1) 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
A 4.800 1 4.800 1.113 .292 .002 1.113 .183 
B 1584.133 1 1584.133 367.259 .000 .450 367.259 1.000 
C 2367.408 1 2367.408 548.851 .000 .551 548.851 1.000 
D 3.333E-02 1 3.33E-02 .008 .930 .000 .008 .051 
E .533 1 .533 .124 .725 .000 .124 .064 
A * B .408 1 .408 .095 .758 .000 .095 .061 
A * C 2.700 1 2.700 .626 .429 .001 .626 .124 
B * C .833 1 .833 .193 .660 .000 .193 .072 
A * B * C 1.008 1 1.008 .234 .629 .001 .234 .077 
A * D 7.500E-02 1 7.50E-02 .017 .895 .000 .017 .052 
B * D 8.333E-03 1 8.33E-03 .002 .965 .000 .002 .050 
A * B * D .533 1 .533 .124 .725 .000 .124 .064 
C * D .833 1 .833 .193 .660 .000 .193 .072 
A * C * D 7.500E-02 1 7.50E-02 .017 .895 .000 .017 .052 
B * C * D .408 1 .408 .095 .758 .000 .095 .061 
A * B * C * D 3.333E-02 1 3.33E-02 .008 .930 .000 .008 .051 
A * E .675 1 .675 .156 .693 .000 .156 .068 
B * E 1.008 1 1.008 .234 .629 .001 .234 .077 
A * B * E .833 1 .833 .193 .660 .000 .193 .072 
C * E .533 1 .533 .124 .725 .000 .124 .064 
A * C * E 8.333E-03 1 8.33E-03 .002 .965 .000 .002 .050 
B * C * E .675 1 .675 .156 .693 .000 .156 .068 
A * B * C * E 2.133 1 2.133 .495 .482 .001 .495 .108 
D * E 1.008 1 1.008 .234 .629 .001 .234 .077 
A * D * E 6.533 1 6.533 1.515 .219 .003 1.515 .233 
B * D * E 2.133 1 2.133 .495 .482 .001 .495 .108 
A * B * D * E 8.333E-03 1 8.33E-03 .002 .965 .000 .002 .050 
C * D * E 2.408 1 2.408 .558 .455 .001 .558 .116 
A * C * D * E .300 1 .300 .070 .792 .000 .070 .058 
B * C * D * E .133 1 .133 .031 .861 .000 .031 .054 
A * B * C * D * E 8.333E-03 1 8.33E-03 .002 .965 .000 .002 .050 
Error 1932.400 448 4.313      
Corrected Total 5913.792 479       
A : Vehicle Breakdown  B : Air Attack   C : Artillery Attack 
D : Number of Ammunition Depot Loading Points  E : Number of Company Fuel Supply Points 
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 Table C.8. SPSS Output of Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-2) 
Source Type III Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
A 3.828 1 3.828 .948 .331 .003 .948 .163 
B 1535.628 1 1535.628 380.374 .000 .569 380.374 1.000 
C 1069.453 1 1069.453 264.903 .000 .479 264.903 1.000 
D 3.125E-03 1 3.12E-03 .001 .978 .000 .001 .050 
E .378 1 .378 .094 .760 .000 .094 .061 
A * B 2.278 1 2.278 .564 .453 .002 .564 .116 
A * C .153 1 .153 .038 .846 .000 .038 .054 
B * C 2.628 1 2.628 .651 .420 .002 .651 .127 
A * B * C 3.125E-03 1 3.12E-03 .001 .978 .000 .001 .050 
A * D .253 1 .253 .063 .802 .000 .063 .057 
B * D .378 1 .378 .094 .760 .000 .094 .061 
A * B * D .253 1 .253 .063 .802 .000 .063 .057 
C * D 7.812E-02 1 7.81E-02 .019 .889 .000 .019 .052 
A * C * D 3.125E-03 1 3.12E-03 .001 .978 .000 .001 .050 
B * C * D .703 1 .703 .174 .677 .001 .174 .070 
 A* B * C * D .703 1 .703 .174 .677 .001 .174 .070 
A * E 1.378 1 1.378 .341 .560 .001 .341 .090 
B * E 1.653 1 1.653 .409 .523 .001 .409 .098 
A * B * E .528 1 .528 .131 .718 .000 .131 .065 
C * E 1.128 1 1.128 .279 .597 .001 .279 .082 
A * C * E 3.125E-03 1 3.12E-03 .001 .978 .000 .001 .050 
B * C * E 3.003 1 3.003 .744 .389 .003 .744 .138 
A * B * C * E 3.125E-03 1 3.12E-03 .001 .978 .000 .001 .050 
D * E 1.378 1 1.378 .341 .560 .001 .341 .090 
A * D * E .703 1 .703 .174 .677 .001 .174 .070 
B * D * E 5.253 1 5.253 1.301 .255 .004 1.301 .206 
A * B * D * E .153 1 .153 .038 .846 .000 .038 .054 
C * D * E .253 1 .253 .063 .802 .000 .063 .057 
A * C * D * E .253 1 .253 .063 .802 .000 .063 .057 
B * C * D * E .528 1 .528 .131 .718 .000 .131 .065 
A * B * C * D * E .153 1 .153 .038 .846 .000 .038 .054 
Error 1162.700 288 4.037      
Corrected Total 3795.797 319       
A : Vehicle Breakdown  B : Air Attack     C : Artillery Attack 
D : Number of Ammunition Depot Loading Points    E : Number of Company Fuel SupplyPoints 
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APPENDIX-D 
RESIDUAL ANALYSIS AND SCATTER PLOTS OF RESIDUALS 
 
Table D.1. Residual Analysis for Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-1) 
DESIGN POINTS y y^ e = y – y^ 
00000 553.491 541.550 11.941 
10000 590.465 592.194 -1.729 
01000 585.465 577.268 8.197 
00100 564.697 554.166 10.531 
00010 433.142 425.45 7.692 
00001 505.48 509.492 -4.012 
11000 608.921 601.092 7.829 
10100 593.458 580.216 13.242 
10010 467.289 476.094 -8.805 
10001 515.143 540.136 -24.993 
01100 523.435 559.884 -36.449 
01010 461.521 461.168 0.353 
01001 546.084 545.21 0.874 
00110 453.713 438.066 15.647 
00101 530.35 522.108 8.242 
00011 399.602 393.392 6.21 
11100 566.676 588.476 -21.8 
11010 474.547 484.992 -10.445 
11001 591.549 569.034 22.515 
10110 467.971 463.478 4.493 
10101 565.373 547.52 17.853 
10011 410.584 444.036 -33.452 
01110 475.751 473.784 1.967 
01101 564.283 557.826 6.457 
01011 419.986 429.11 -9.124 
00111 409.666 406.008 3.658 
11110 499.085 472.376 26.709 
11101 587.173 556.418 30.755 
11011 438.162 452.934 -14.772 
10111 424.257 431.42 -7.163 
01111 439.523 441.726 -2.203 
11111 459.453 440.318 19.135 
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 Figure D.1. Scatter Plot of Residuals for Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-1) 
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 Table D.2. Residual Analysis for Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-2) 
 
DESIGN POINTS y y^ e = y – y^ 
00000 410.269 412.484 -2.215 
10000 412.717 422.53 -9.813 
01000 434.319 444.408 -10.089 
00100 409.891 412.484 -2.593 
00010 351.179 347.684 3.495 
00001 389.708 388.526 1.182 
11000 448.088 434.562 13.526 
10100 416.731 422.53 -5.799 
10010 355.014 357.73 -2.716 
10001 406.451 398.572 7.879 
01100 437.53 444.608 -7.078 
01010 368.196 379.808 -11.612 
01001 401.783 420.065 -18.282 
00110 357.607 347.684 9.923 
00101 388.403 388.526 -0.123 
00011 321.923 323.726 -1.803 
11100 444.593 434.562 10.031 
11010 371.881 369.762 2.119 
11001 419.221 410.204 9.017 
10110 362.714 357.73 4.984 
10101 393.091 398.572 -5.481 
10011 329.567 333.772 -4.205 
01110 375.837 379.808 -3.971 
01101 407.61 420.65 -13.04 
01011 331.475 355.85 -24.375 
00111 335.034 323.726 11.308 
11110 381.773 369.762 12.011 
11101 444.805 420.604 24.201 
11011 345.325 345.804 -0.479 
10111 329.743 333.772 -4.029 
01111 350.446 355.85 -5.404 
11111 360.424 345.804 14.62 
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Residuals of maximum time-in-system statistics (model-2)
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 Figure D.2. Scatter Plot of Residuals for Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-2) 
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 Table D.3. Residual Analysis for Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-1) 
DESIGN POINTS y y^ e = y – y^ 
00000 1.733 1.943 -0.2096 
10000 1.933 1.943 -0.0096 
01000 5.6 5.595 0.005 
00100 6.266 6.383 -0.1163 
00010 2.333 1.943 0.39033 
00001 1.866 1.943 -0.0763 
11000 5.733 5.595 0.13833 
10100 6.933 6.383 0.5503 
10010 2.066 1.943 0.1236 
10001 1.933 1.943 -0.0096 
01100 9.933 10.015 -0.0816 
01010 5.666 5.595 0.0716 
01001 5.533 5.595 -0.0616 
00110 6.333 6.383 -0.0496 
00101 6.4 6.383 0.017 
00011 1.666 1.943 -0.2763 
11100 10.266 10.015 0.2516 
11010 5.533 5.595 -0.0616 
11001 5.333 5.595 -0.2616 
10110 6.333 6.383 -0.0496 
10101 6.2 6.383 -0.183 
10011 2 1.943 0.057 
01110 9.733 10.015 -0.2816 
01101 9.733 10.015 -0.281 
01011 5.466 5.595 -0.1283 
00111 6.133 6.383 -0.2496 
11110 9.8 10.015 -0.215 
11101 10.133 10.015 0.1183 
11011 5.733 5.595 0.1383 
10111 6.467 6.383 0.0836 
01111 9.667 10.015 -0.3483 
11111 10.867 10.015 0.8516 
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Figure D.3. Scatter Plot of Residuals for Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-1) 
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 Table D.4. Residual Analysis for Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-2) 
 
DESIGN POINTS y y^ e = y – y^ 
00000 2.1 2.185 -0.085 
10000 2.3 2.185 0.115 
01000 6.6 6.565 0.035 
00100 5.9 5.841 0.059 
00010 2.5 2.185 0.315 
00001 2.3 2.185 0.115 
11000 6.7 6.565 0.135 
10100 5.8 5.841 -0.041 
10010 2.2 2.185 0.015 
10001 2.3 2.185 0.115 
01100 10.1 10.221 -0.121 
01010 6.3 6.565 -0.265 
01001 6.2 6.565 -0.365 
00110 5.7 5.841 -0.141 
00101 5.8 5.841 -0.041 
00011 2.2 2.185 0.015 
11100 10.4 10.221 0.179 
11010 6.5 6.565 -0.065 
11001 6.4 6.565 -0.165 
10110 5.9 5.841 0.059 
10101 5.9 5.841 0.059 
10011 2.3 2.185 0.115 
01110 9.8 10.221 -0.421 
01101 10 10.221 -0.221 
01011 6.1 6.565 -0.465 
00111 5.4 5.841 -0.441 
11110 9.9 10.221 -0.321 
11101 10.5 10.221 0.279 
11011 7 6.565 0.435 
10111 5.6 5.841 -0.241 
01111 10.5 10.221 0.279 
11111 11.3 10.221 1.079 
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 Figure D.4. Scatter Plot of Residuals for Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-2) 
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APPENDIX-E 
ANALYSIS OF NORMAL PROBABILITY PLOTS AND EFFECTS OF MEASURES 
 
 
Table E.1. Analysis of Normal P-P Plot Effects of Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-1) 
ORDER(j) EFFECT ESTIMATE (j - 0.5) / 32 
31 1 24.619 0.9531 
30 2 22.308 0.9218 
29 3-4-5 11.097 0.8906 
28 3-5 10.471 0.8593 
27 1-2-3 7.916 0.8281 
26 3 7.714 0.7968 
25 2-3-5 3.548 0.7656 
24 1-2-3-4 3.017 0.7343 
23 1-2-5 2.955 0.7031 
22 2-4 2.917 0.6718 
21 1-2-3-4-5 2.742 0.6406 
20 1-3-4-5 1.483 0.6093 
19 2-5 1.269 0.5781 
18 3-4 0.785 0.5468 
17 1-3-5 0.384 0.5156 
16 1-2-4-5 0.116 0.4843 
15 1-4-5 -1.105 0.4531 
14 1-3-4 -1.16 0.4218 
13 1-2-4 -1.508 0.3906 
12 1-5 -2.529 0.3537 
11 2-3-4-5 -3.601 0.3281 
10 1-4 -6.064 0.2968 
9 1-2-3-5 -6.749 0.2656 
8 2-3 -9.071 0.2343 
7 4-5 -9.413 0.2031 
6 2-4-5 -11.383 0.1718 
5 3-4-5 -11.903 0.1406 
4 1-3 -12.616 0.1093 
3 1-2 -13.411 0.0781 
2 5 -32.059 0.0468 
1 4 -116.11 0.0156 
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 Figure E.1. Normal Probability Plot of Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-1) 
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Table E.2. Analysis of Normal P-P Plot Effects of Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-2) 
ORDER(j) EFFECT ESTIMATE (j - 0.5) / 32 
31 2 22.079 0.9531 
30 1 9.433 0.9218 
29 3 6.194 0.8906 
28 1-2-3 5.225 0.8593 
27 2-3-5 4.21 0.8281 
26 2-3 4.146 0.7968 
25 3-4 3.682 0.7656 
24 1-5 3.347 0.7343 
23 1-2-3-5 3.187 0.7031 
22 1-2-5 2.653 0.6718 
21 3-5 1.818 0.6406 
20 1-4-5 1.211 0.6093 
19 3-4-5 0.143 0.5781 
18 1-2-4-5 -0.053 0.5468 
17 1-3-5 -0.644 0.5156 
16 1-2-3-4 -0.667 0.4843 
15 2-3-4 -1.123 0.4531 
14 1-3-4 -1.167 0.4218 
13 2-5 -1.182 0.3906 
12 1-2-4 -1.412 0.3537 
11 1-3-4-5 -1.896 0.3281 
10 2-3-4-5 -2.038 0.2968 
9 1-2-3-4-5 -2.176 0.2656 
8 1-4-5 -2.395 0.2343 
7 4-5 -3.574 0.2031 
6 1-4 -3.84 0.1718 
5 2-4 -4.257 0.1406 
4 1-3 -6.387 0.1093 
3 1-2 -10.047 0.0781 
2 5 -23.958 0.0468 
1 4 -64.817 0.0156 
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 Figure E.2. Normal Probability Plot of Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-2) 
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Table E.3. Analysis of Normal P-P Plot Effects of Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-1) 
ORDER(j) EFFECT ESTIMATE (j - 0.5) / 32 
31 3 4.441 0.9531 
30 2 3.633 0.9218 
29 1-4-5 0.233 0.8906 
28 1 0.2 0.8593 
27 1-3 0.15 0.8281 
26 3-4-5 0.141 0.7968 
25 1-2-3-5 0.133 0.7656 
24 2-4-5 0.133 0.7343 
23 2-5 0.091 0.7031 
22 1-2-3 0.091 0.6718 
21 4-5 0.091 0.6406 
20 1-2-5 0.083 0.6093 
19 2-3-5 0.075 0.5781 
18 1-5 0.075 0.5468 
17 1-2-4 0.066 0.5156 
16 3-5 0.066 0.4843 
15 2-3-4 0.058 0.4531 
14 1-2 0.058 0.4218 
13 1-3-4-5 0.05 0.3906 
12 1-3-4 0.025 0.3537 
11 1-4 0.025 0.3281 
10 1-2-3-4 0.016 0.2968 
9 4 0.016 0.2656 
8 1-3-5 0.008 0.2343 
7 2-4 0.008 0.2031 
6 2-3 0.001 0.1718 
5 1-2-4-5 -0.008 0.1406 
4 1-2-3-4-5 -0.008 0.1093 
3 2-3-4-5 -0.033 0.0781 
2 5 -0.066 0.0468 
1 3-4 -0.083 0.0156 
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 Figure E.3. Normal Probability Plot of Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-1) 
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Table E.4. Analysis of Normal P-P Plot Effects of Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-2) 
ORDER(j) EFFECT ESTIMATE (j - 0.5) / 32 
31 2 4.381 0.9531 
30 3 3.656 0.9218 
29 2-4-5 0.256 0.8906 
28 1 0.218 0.8593 
27 2-3-5 0.193 0.8281 
26 2-3 0.181 0.7968 
25 1-2 0.168 0.7656 
24 2-5 0.143 0.7343 
23 4-5 0.131 0.7031 
22 1-5 0.131 0.6718 
21 3-5 0.118 0.6406 
20 1-4-5 0.093 0.6093 
19 2-3-4 0.093 0.5781 
18 2-3-4-5 0.081 0.5468 
17 1-2-5 0.081 0.5156 
16 2-4 0.068 0.4843 
15 5 0.068 0.4531 
14 1-2-4 0.056 0.4218 
13 3-4-5 0.056 0.3906 
12 1-4 0.056 0.3537 
11 1-2-4-5 0.043 0.3281 
10 1-3 0.043 0.2968 
9 1-2-3-4-5 0.043 0.2656 
8 1-3-4 0.006 0.2343 
7 1-3-5 0.006 0.2031 
6 1-2-3-5 0.006 0.1718 
5 1-2-3 -0.006 0.1406 
4 4 -0.006 0.1093 
3 3-4 -0.031 0.0781 
2 1-3-4-5 -0.056 0.0468 
1 1-2-3-4 -0.093 0.0156 
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 Figure E.4. Normal Probability Plot of Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 141 
 
APPENDIX-F 
SCATTER PLOTS OF VARIANCES OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
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 Figure F.1. Scatter Plot of Variances of Maximum Time-in-System Measure (Model-1) 
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 Figure F.2. Scatter Plot of Variances of Maximum Time-in-System Measure (Model-2) 
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 Figure F.3. Scatter Plot of Variances of Number of Destroyed Vehicles Measure (Model-1) 
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Figure F.4. Scatter Plot of Variances of Number of Destroyed Vehicles Measure (Model-2) 
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APPENDIX-G 
 
PART OF CODE FOR MODEL-1 (MODEL FRAME) 
 
 
0$            CREATE,        9::MARK(Timeinw); 
1$            ASSIGN:        NS=Truck1path: 
                             bolukno=1:MARK(march1w) 
 
2$            STATION,       hazirlik1; 
Gettruck1     QUEUE,         Truck1q; 
3$            REQUEST,       1:Truck1(sds); 
4$            TRANSPORT:     Truck1,seq; 
 
5$            STATION,       arizatek1; 
6$            BRANCH,        1: 
                             With,0.1,dur1,Yes: 
                             Else,devam1,Yes; 
dur1          BRANCH,        1: 
                             With,0.47,git1,Yes: 
                             With,0.34,git2,Yes: 
                             With,0.16,git3,Yes: 
                             Else,harap1,Yes; 
git1          ASSIGN:        zayiat1=tria(1,6,11):NEXT(bakim1); 
bakim1        FREE:          Truck1; 
316$          DELAY:         zayiat1:NEXT(Gettruck1); 
git2          ASSIGN:        zayiat1=tria(11,17,23):NEXT(bakim1); 
git3          ASSIGN:        zayiat1=tria(30,34,38):NEXT(bakim1); 
harap1        COUNT:         BreakHek C1WV,1; 
216$          ASSIGN:        c1wvdamaged=c1wvdamaged+1; 
254$          FREE:          Truck1; 
93$           BRANCH,        2: 
                             If,bolukno==1,tekerlek,Yes: 
                             Always,enkaz111,Yes; 
tekerlek      COUNT:         WV  Hek,1; 
248$          ASSIGN:        wvtoplam=wvtoplam+1; 
100$          DISPOSE; 
 
enkaz111      COUNT:         Hek C1,1:NEXT(toplam); 
toplam        COUNT:         Hek TOTAL,1; 
92$           DISPOSE; 
devam1        FREE:          Truck1:NEXT(Gettruck1); 
 
7$            STATION,       artillery1; 
8$            BRANCH,        1: 
                             With,0.2,silah1,Yes: 
                             Else,devam11,Yes; 
silah1        BRANCH,        1: 
                             With,0.55,git4,Yes: 
                             With,0.2,git5,Yes: 
                             With,0.1,git6,Yes: 
                             Else,harap11,Yes; 
git4          ASSIGN:        zayiat1=Tria(4,8,12):NEXT(bakim11); 
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bakim11       FREE:          Truck1; 
337$          ASSIGN:        say1=say1+1; 
317$          DELAY:         zayiat1:NEXT(Gettruck1); 
 
git5          ASSIGN:        zayiat1=Tria(15,21,27):NEXT(bakim11); 
 
git6          ASSIGN:        zayiat1=Tria(30,35,40):NEXT(bakim11); 
 
harap11       COUNT:         ArtHek   C1WV,1; 
 
217$          ASSIGN:        c1wvdamaged=c1wvdamaged+1; 
408$          FREE:          Truck1; 
 
94$           BRANCH,        2: 
                             If,bolukno==1,tekerlek,Yes: 
                             Always,enkaz111,Yes; 
devam11       FREE:          Truck1; 
255$          ASSIGN:        say1=say1+1:NEXT(Gettruck1); 
9$            CREATE,        9::MARK(Timeinw); 
10$           ASSIGN:        NS=Truck2path: 
                             bolukno=2:MARK(march1w); 
188$          WAIT:          987,9; 
 
11$           STATION,       hazirlik2; 
349$          DELAY:         Tria(22,29,36); 
Gettruck2     QUEUE,         Truck2q; 
12$           REQUEST,       1:Truck2(sds); 
13$           TRANSPORT:     Truck2,seq; 
 
14$           STATION,       arizatek2; 
15$           BRANCH,        1: 
                             With,0.1,dur2,Yes: 
                             Else,devam2,Yes; 
 
dur2          BRANCH,        1: 
                             With,0.47,git21,Yes: 
                             With,0.34,git22,Yes: 
                             With,0.16,git23,Yes: 
                             Else,harap2,Yes; 
git21         ASSIGN:        zayiat2=tria(1,6,11):NEXT(bakim2); 
bakim2        FREE:          Truck2; 
311$          DELAY:         zayiat2:NEXT(Gettruck2); 
 
git22         ASSIGN:        zayiat2=tria(11,17,23):NEXT(bakim2); 
 
git23         ASSIGN:        zayiat1=tria(30,34,38):NEXT(bakim2); 
harap2        COUNT:         BreakHek C2WV,1; 
228$          ASSIGN:        c2wvdamaged=c2wvdamaged+1; 
261$          FREE:          Truck2; 
 
95$           BRANCH,        2: 
                             If,bolukno==2,tekerlek,Yes: 
                             Always,enkaz222,Yes; 
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PART OF CODE FOR MODEL-2 (MODEL FRAME) 
 
 
0$            CREATE,        9; 
4$            ASSIGN:        bl#=1:NEXT(disperse1); 
 
disperse1     STATION,       garage1; 
255$          DELAY:         tria(5,10,15); 
peace         QUEUE,         comp1; 
war           QUEUE,         company1; 
420$          REQUEST,       1:vec1(sds); 
562$          DELAY:         tria(1,2,3); 
421$          TRANSPORT:     vec1,DA1; 
 
1$            CREATE,        9; 
5$            ASSIGN:        bl#=2:NEXT(disperse2); 
 
disperse2     STATION,       garage2; 
422$          DELAY:         tria(5,10,15); 
438$          BRANCH,        1: 
                             If,bl#==2,peace2,Yes: 
                             If,bl#==22,war2,Yes; 
peace2        QUEUE,         comp2; 
439$          REQUEST,       1:vec22(sds); 
557$          DELAY:         tria(12,15,18); 
440$          TRANSPORT:     vec22,DA2; 
 
war2          QUEUE,         company2; 
424$          REQUEST,       1:vec2(sds); 
558$          DELAY:         tria(1,2,3); 
425$          TRANSPORT:     vec2,DA2; 
 
2$            CREATE,        9; 
6$            ASSIGN:        bl#=3:NEXT(disperse3); 
 
disperse3     STATION,       garage3; 
426$          DELAY:         tria(5,10,15); 
441$          BRANCH,        1: 
                             If,bl#==3,peace3,Yes: 
                             If,bl#==33,war3,Yes; 
peace3        QUEUE,         comp3; 
428$          REQUEST,       1:vec33(sds); 
561$          DELAY:         tria(12,13,14); 
429$          TRANSPORT:     vec33,DA3; 
 
war3          QUEUE,         company3; 
442$          REQUEST,       1:vec3(sds); 
 
560$          DELAY:         tria(1,2,3); 
443$          TRANSPORT:     vec3,DA3; 
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3$            CREATE,        44; 
7$            ASSIGN:        bl#=4:NEXT(disperse4); 
 
disperse4     STATION,       garage4; 
430$          DELAY:         tria(5,10,15); 
432$          QUEUE,         company4; 
433$          REQUEST,       1:vec4(sds); 
559$          DELAY:         tria(3,6,9); 
434$          TRANSPORT:     vec4,DA4; 
 
13$           CREATE,        15; 
16$           ASSIGN:        bl#=11:NEXT(disperse1); 
 
14$           CREATE,        13; 
17$           ASSIGN:        bl#=22:NEXT(disperse2); 
 
15$           CREATE,        13; 
18$           ASSIGN:        bl#=33:NEXT(disperse3); 
 
23$           STATION,       shell2;                                         
24$           BRANCH,        1: 
                             With,0.2,done2,Yes: 
                             Else,ahead22,Yes; 
done2         BRANCH,        1: 
                             With,0.33,below44,Yes: 
                             With,0.25,below55,Yes: 
                             With,0.22,below66,Yes: 
                             Else,zayi22,Yes; 
 
below44       ASSIGN:        effect22=Tria(6,12,18):NEXT(wait22); 
 
wait22        DELAY:         effect22; 
497$          FREE:          man2; 
509$          ASSIGN:        sayi6=sayi6+1:NEXT(ammotruck2); 
 
ammotruck2    QUEUE,         convoy2q; 
85$           REQUEST,       1:man2(sds); 
86$           TRANSPORT:     man2,seq; 
 
below55       ASSIGN:        effect22=Tria(21,25,29):NEXT(wait22); 
 
below66       ASSIGN:        effect22=Tria(32,37,42):NEXT(wait22); 
 
zayi22        COUNT:         ArtHek   C2AmmoTruck,1; 
517$          FREE:          man2; 
382$          ASSIGN:        c4wvdamaged=c4wvdamaged+1; 
309$          SIGNAL:        862; 
 
26$           BRANCH,        2: 
                             If,bl#==42,toplam4,Yes: 
                             Always,wheeled,Yes; 
toplam4       COUNT:         Hek   C4,1:NEXT(toplam); 
toplam        COUNT:         Hek   TOTAL,1; 
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APPENDIX-H 
STRUCTURE OF AN ARMORED BATTALION 
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APPENDIX-I 
PAIRWISE COMPARISON AND NORMALIZED MATRICES 
 
We name the regions of Turkey as Region-1.....Region-8 for simplicity. We give the list of 
names below. 
 
Greek border        : Region-1 
Aegean                 : Region-2 
Iranian border      : Region-3 
Iraqi border      : Region-4 
Syrian border       : Region-5 
Bulgarian border  : Region-6 
Eastern Black Sea: Region-7 
Mediterranean     : Region-8 
 
There are two criteria in our study and these are: 
Criterion-1 (C1) : Maximum time-in-system 
Criterion-2 (C2) : Number of destroyed vehicles 
 
We present the pairwise comparison matrix of criteria below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 C1 C2 
C1 1 6/5 
C2 5/6 1 
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Reference region names on p. 150 
 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix of Regions According to Maximum Time-in-System Criterion (Model-1) 
 Region-1 Region-2 Region-3 Region-4 Region-5 Region-6 Region-7 Region-8 
Region-1 1 2.52 3.83 4.85 5.61 7.19 8.59 10 
Region-2 0.39 1 1.31 2.33 3.09 4.67 6.07 7.47 
Region-3 0.26 0.76 1 1.03 1.77 3.36 4.76 6.17 
Region-4 0.21 0.43 0.97 1 1.02 2.33 3.74 5.14 
Region-5 0.18 0.32 0.56 0.98 1 1.59 2.99 4.39 
Region-6 0.14 0.21 0.29 0.43 0.63 1 1.41 2.81 
Region-7 0.11 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.33 0.71 1 1.4 
Region-8 0.1 0.13 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.35 0.71 1 
 
 
Normalized Matrix According to Maximum Time-in-System Criterion (Model-1) 
 Region-1 Region-2 Region-3 Region-4 Region-5 Region-6 Region-7 Region-8 
Region-1 0.42 0.45 0.46 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.41 0.37 
Region-2 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.20 
Region-3 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.17 
Region-4 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.14 
Region-5 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.11 
Region-6 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 
Region-7 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 
Region-8 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
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Reference region names on p. 150 
 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix of Regions According to Number of Destroyed Vehicles Criterion 
(Model-1) 
 Region-1 Region-2 Region-3 Region-4 Region-5 Region-6 Region-7 Region-8 
Region-1 1 3.68 0.96 1.92 1.39 2.79 5.94 9.47 
Region-2 0.27 1 0.23 0.56 0.44 0.98 2.26 5.78 
Region-3 1.04 4.21 1 2.44 1.92 3.31 6.47 10 
Region-4 0.51 1.76 0.41 1 0.97 1.05 4.02 7.55 
Region-5 0.72 2.28 0.52 1.03 1 1.38 4.55 8.08 
Region-6 0.36 1.02 0.30 0.95 0.72 1 3.15 6.68 
Region-7 0.19 0.44 0.15 0.25 0.22 0.32 1 3.52 
Region-8 0.11 0.17 0.1 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.28 1 
 
 
Normalized Matrix According to Number of Destroyed Vehicles Criterion (Model-1) 
 Region-1 Region-2 Region-3 Region-4 Region-5 Region-6 Region-7 Region-8 
Region-1 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.21 0.19 
Region-2 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.10 
Region-3 0.24 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.3 0.24 0.21 
Region-4 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.1 0.14 0.14 
Region-5 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.15 
Region-6 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.1 0.09 0.11 0.12 
Region-7 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 
Region-8 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
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Reference region names on p. 150 
 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix of Regions According to Maximum Time-in-System Criterion (Model-2) 
 Region-1 Region-2 Region-3 Region-4 Region-5 Region-6 Region-7 Region-8 
Region-1 1 2.43 1.03 3.45 6.82 4.85 8.78 10 
Region-2 0.41 1 0.71 1.02 4.39 2.43 6.35 7.57 
Region-3 0.97 1.40 1 2.42 5.79 3.83 7.75 8.97 
Region-4 0.29 0.98 0.41 1 3.36 1.41 5.32 6.54 
Region-5 0.14 0.22 0.17 0.30 1 0.51 1.95 3.17 
Region-6 0.20 0.42 0.26 0.71 1.96 1 3.92 5.14 
Region-7 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.51 0.26 1 1.21 
Region-8 0.1 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.31 0.19 0.83 1 
 
 
Normalized Matrix According to Maximum Time-in-System Criterion (Model-2) 
 Region-1 Region-2 Region-3 Region-4 Region-5 Region-6 Region-7 Region-8 
Region-1 0.31 0.36 0.27 0.37 0.28 0.34 0.25 0.25 
Region-2 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.17 
Region-3 0.30 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.21 0.21 
Region-4 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.12 
Region-5 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.07 
Region-6 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.11 
Region-7 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Region-8 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 
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Reference region names on p. 150 
 
Pairwise Comparison Matrix of Regions According to Number of Destroyed Vehicles Criterion 
(Model-2) 
 Region-1 Region-2 Region-3 Region-4 Region-5 Region-6 Region-7 Region-8 
Region-1 1 2.38 0.95 1.10 1.43 2.50 5.54 9.52 
Region-2 0.42 1 0.35 0.62 0.98 1.04 3.16 7.14 
Region-3 1.05 2.85 1 1.26 1.90 3.33 6.01 10 
Region-4 0.91 1.59 0.79 1 1.08 2.07 4.76 8.73 
Region-5 0.69 1.02 0.53 0.92 1 1.43 4.12 8.09 
Region-6 0.40 0.96 0.30 0.48 0.69 1 2.69 6.66 
Region-7 0.18 0.31 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.37 1 3.97 
Region-8 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.19 0.25 1 
 
 
Normalized Matrix According to Number of Destroyed Vehicles Criterion (Model-2) 
 Region-1 Region-2 Region-3 Region-4 Region-5 Region-6 Region-7 Region-8 
Region-1 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.18 
Region-2 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.13 
Region-3 0.22 0.27 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.22 0.19 
Region-4 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 
Region-5 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.15 
Region-6 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.12 
Region-7 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 
Region-8 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
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RINOTT PROCEDURE RESULTS FOR EACH REGION 
 
 
 
Table J.1. Averages and Variances of 15 Replications According to Maximum Time-in-System   
Statistics for Regions (Model-1) 
 Greek border 
Bulgarian 
border 
Syrian 
border 
Iranian 
border 
Iraqi 
border 
Eastern 
Black Sea Aegean Medit. 
1 533.67 468.73 532.17 517.26 538.58 428.75 562.18 428.76 
2 634.98 527.76 423.07 438.91 527.06 512.06 624.96 521.75 
3 601.56 578.97 501.24 648.93 463.82 533.75 462.17 438.65 
4 554.87 435.76 441.69 549.73 447.92 468.98 544.82 497.68 
5 642.67 488.36 598.45 473.18 631.78 510.75 582.72 541.42 
6 499.78 458.23 567.87 527.74 589.46 543.27 637.75 499.67 
7 486.56 586.01 604.41 514.96 545.32 575.32 609.42 525.85 
8 677.82 512.32 588.53 600.01 439.73 454.71 479.37 467.45 
9 634.55 564.11 530.78 559.37 675.63 455.03 583.14 584.98 
10 538.96 432.98 522.03 611.83 548.01 527.48 643.08 437.64 
11 685.99 509.63 497.21 596.36 501.37 426.83 474.72 453.65 
12 502.43 577.69 566.73 585.73 599.63 595.42 457.34 527.08 
13 624.09 554.32 584.38 656.69 478.72 488.65 654.87 427.86 
14 578.31 445.37 615.87 489.66 582.27 503.35 614.73 475.74 
15 685.21 590.65 408.37 495.27 531.35 479.72 549.77 452.08 
Average 592.091 515.39 532.18 551.04 540.04 500.27 565.40 485.35 
Variance 4832.83 3347.85 4477.72 4190.37 4609.16 2487.282 4745.89 2258.7 
St.Dev. 69.518 57.868 66.91 64.738 67.893 49.876 68.89 47.525 
 
 
 
 
 
Table J.2. Total Sample Sizes (Ni) Needed for Each Region and Averages of Total Sample Sizes 
According to Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-1) 
 Greek border 
Bulgarian 
border 
Syrian 
border 
Iranian 
border 
Iraqi 
border 
Eastern 
Black Sea Aegean Medit. 
Ni 27 23 26 25 26 20 27 18 
Average 587.82 518.73 526.77 549.26 545.37 492.27 558.27 479.25 
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Table J.3. Averages and Variances of 15 Replications According to Number of Destroyed Vehicles   
                 Statistics for Regions (Model-1) 
 Greek border 
Bulgarian 
border 
Syrian 
border 
Iranian 
border 
Iraqi 
border 
Eastern 
Black Sea Aegean Medit. 
1 6 7 7 5 6 3 4 3 
2 3 2 2 3 1 0 7 0 
3 7 5 4 10 4 2 1 1 
4 8 1 2 6 7 1 6 2 
5 8 7 8 4 7 2 3 0 
6 4 6 7 5 6 5 7 3 
7 7 3 2 9 5 6 3 5 
8 5 2 6 7 3 3 3 3 
9 6 8 5 3 5 4 4 2 
10 2 5 6 2 7 6 5 1 
11 4 7 7 4 9 3 7 3 
12 2 4 6 9 2 4 3 0 
13 6 5 7 8 3 5 2 3 
14 9 4 4 4 5 4 5 2 
15 8 3 4 9 4 3 4 3 
Average 5.667 4.6 5.133 5.867 4.933 3.4 4.267 2.067 
Variance 5.095 4.542 4.123 6.382 4.328 2.773 3.262 1.928 
St.Dev. 2.257 2.131 2.030 2.614 2.153 1.723 1.869 1.437 
 
 
 
 
 
Table J.4. Total Sample Sizes (Ni) Needed for Each Region and Averages of Total Sample Sizes 
According to Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-1) 
 Greek border 
Bulgarian 
border 
Syrian 
border 
Iranian 
border 
Iraqi 
border 
Eastern 
BlackSea Aegean Medit. 
Ni 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Average 5.667 4.6 5.133 5.867 5.067 3.4 4.267 2.067 
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Table J.5. Averages and Variances of 15 Replications According to Maximum Time-in-System 
Statistics for Regions (Model-2) 
 Greek border 
Bulgarian 
border 
Syrian 
border 
Iranian 
border 
Iraqi 
border 
Eastern 
Black Sea Aegean Medit. 
1 572.73 436.82 508.53 591.36 475.19 473.19 481.98 466.17 
2 498.27 509.71 419.03 537.18 538.27 377.28 562.17 483.21 
3 453.18 578.28 419.53 419.38 452.61 401.27 498.18 355.05 
4 605.34 473.32 415.62 483.28 421.63 428.52 451.29 378.63 
5 562.31 416.83 490.53 423.84 571.82 396.73 587.32 421.38 
6 589.34 429.67 400.47 503.22 528.08 464.94 426.64 369.53 
7 442.09 401.72 495.04 539.51 423.43 401.37 414.29 394.36 
8 480.42 528.87 415.79 482.41 401.26 373.49 501.21 405.21 
9 613.27 478.26 412.72 452.09 503.43 367.06 599.03 383.24 
10 472.21 442.37 408.69 519.01 517.88 489.52 451.26 405.28 
11 588.05 430.74 397.47 448.29 490.71 417.93 428.42 362.12 
12 452.79 472.19 537.98 581.64 429.17 486.53 403.52 411.34 
13 501.36 401.08 403.39 409.03 417.53 415.86 539.01 448.74 
14 437.73 488.51 399.86 553.71 563.14 375.18 435.95 383.04 
15 412.78 420.92 474.42 582.18 404.25 403.43 510.23 417.29 
Average 512.125 460.619 439.938 501.742 475.893 418.153 486.033 405.639 
Variance 4789.14 2539.57 2225.04 3860.96 3478.62 1747.47 4024.1 1398.67 
St.Dev. 69.2036 50.3942 47.1703 62.1366 58.9798 41.8027 63.4358 37.3989 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table J.6. Total Sample Sizes (Ni) Needed for Each Region and Averages of Total Sample Sizes 
According to Maximum Time-in-System Statistics (Model-2) 
 Greek border 
Bulgarian 
border 
Syrian 
border 
Iranian 
border 
Iraqi 
border 
Eastern 
Black Sea Aegean Medit. 
Ni 27 19 18 24 23 16 24 15 
Average 519.62 462.81 446.32 507.27 481.61 411.53 490.02 405.63 
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Table J.7. Averages and Variances of 15 Replications According to Number of Destroyed Vehicles 
Statistics for Regions (Model-2) 
 Greek border 
Bulgarian 
border 
Syrian 
border 
Iranian 
border 
Iraqi 
border 
Eastern 
Black Sea Aegean Medit. 
1 5 3 6 6 3 2 4 1 
2 3 7 3 7 9 7 6 3 
3 9 2 8 3 10 2 8 0 
4 4 8 4 5 6 5 5 2 
5 3 6 7 7 7 3 3 1 
6 5 4 5 10 4 4 5 3 
7 7 3 8 7 5 2 3 2 
8 8 3 3 5 3 3 6 1 
9 6 5 3 3 9 6 3 2 
10 7 4 6 4 4 3 5 1 
11 6 3 9 7 5 2 6 3 
12 3 8 3 9 4 3 9 4 
13 6 5 5 3 7 4 3 0 
14 7 3 3 11 3 4 4 3 
15 9 6 6 4 4 3 3 2 
Average 5.867 4.667 5.267 6.067 5.533 3.533 4.867 1.867 
Variance 4.123 3.809 4.352 6.495 5.552 2.266 3.552 1.409 
St.Dev. 2.030 1.951 2.086 2.548 2.356 1.505 1.884 1.187 
 
 
 
 
 
Table J.8. Total Sample Sizes (Ni) Needed for Each Region and Averages of Total Sample Sizes 
According to Number of Destroyed Vehicles Statistics (Model-2) 
 Greek border 
Bulgarian 
border 
Syrian 
border 
Iranian 
border 
Iraqi 
border 
Eastern 
Black Sea Aegean Medit. 
Ni 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
Average 5.866 4.666 5.267 6.067 5.533 3.533 4.867 1.867 
 
 
 
